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.ABSTRACT
Since the Canada-United States Automobile Agreement came
into effect in 1965 there has been relatively little scholarly
comment on it. This is surprising in view of the attention which
has been given to other bilateral treaties between the two
countries and in view of the effect that the treaty has had on the
operation of the automobile industry in both countries.

In fact,

to the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first study
which has examined the Automobile Agreement from a political point
of view.
The Agreement came into effect at a time of political
re-evaluation in Canada. The Canadian government and the Canadian
people had begun, by 1965» to examine more carefully than ever
before the nature and the implications of the economic ties which
existed between Canada and the United States. Those Canadians who
were opposed to the Automobile Agreement in 19&5 found that their
arguments were overshadowed by the assertions of those presenting
the economic advantages which would presumably come about as a
result of the Agreement.
The Automobile Agreement has been in effect for eight years
and there are now several groups in both countries which are calling
for the abrogation of the Agreement. These groups include some
Canadian automotive parts manufacturers and a radical wing of the

ii

Canadian branch of the United Automobile Workers. In the United
States several prominent Senators and executive officials from the
Johnson and Nixon administrations oppose the Agreement.

It should

be noted that each of these groups opposes the Agreement for its
own set of reasons.
Given the nature of the opposition one might have expected
some alterations in the original Agreement.

The evidence suggests

that this has not occurred due to the support which the Agreement,
in its present form, has received from the major automobile
manufacturers in Canada and the United States and from each of the
national political parties in Canada.
The purpose of this study, then, is to examine whether or
not the Automobile Agreement is in the long term interest of Canada's
political nationality and whether or not the Agreement facilitates
the development of a distinctly Canadian industrial strategy.
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INTRODUCTION

There are wide differences of opinion about the usefulness
of the Auto Agreement on both sides of the Canada-United states
border.

On the one hand there are those who claim that the Canadian

automobile consumer can only benefit "by our continental system of
vehicle assembly"
Pact.

^

which has been partially brought about by the Auto

On the other hand there are those who suggest that the Auto

Pact represents the sale of Canada's "economic birthright",

and

that when such a sale is achieved it is then impossible to "retain ,
your political birthright".

v

There is some truth in each statement.

My own view is that an understanding of the Auto Pact is crucial to
understanding Canadian-American relations.

Indeed, such an understanding

may well be crucial to understanding the future of Canada, both politically and economically.
The Automobile Agreement has brought about economic benefits
for the automobile manufacturers and has brought about an increase in
employment in the automobile industry in this country, but there is

"""K.E. ocott, "Ford Chief Answers $ 50 million Gift Talk",
Globe and Mail, May 10, 19&9.
2
A.D. Hales M.P., "Flashback to 1911", Hamilton Spectator,
May 8, 1965.
5

Ibid.

1

2
little evidence to suggest that these benefits have been passed along,
even indirectly, to the automobile consumer. Furthermore, the Automobile Agreement, in itself, does not represent the sale of Canada's
economic or political birthright, but the integration of the Canadian
and United States automobile industries brought about by the Agreement
does undermine Canada's political nationality.
It is my position that the Automobile Agreement is an inferior
response by the Canadian government to an area of significant stress
on the political system, namely:

the concern of many Canadians about

the implications of massive direct investment in this country coming
from the United States. My concern about the external control of the
Canadian economy is based more on political than economic arguments.
The Automobile Agreement is significant, not so much because it
encourages rationalization of direct investment in Canada, but rather
because the Agreement is a precedent which may possibly inhibit the
Canadian government in devising and implementing economic policies
aimed at achieving Canadian political interests.
These political interests include the promotion of east-west
ties of commerce and culture, as opposed to north-south ties
promoted by the Automobile Agreement, which tend to erode Canada's
national identity; distinctive Canadian international trade and
foreign relations; distinctive Canadian wage and social security
policies and independent tax and monetary policies designed to
achieve national objectives.
Furthermore, the Canadian economy and Canadian trade is]
coming more and more to be founded on secondary manufacturing

i
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industries rather than on primary resource industries.

As this

process continues, It seems likely that various manufacturing sectors
in Canada will have to be rationalized as part of an overall industrial strategy which provides for higher levels of employment of
Canadian resources, including maximum development of Canadian entrepreneurial talent and Canada's human resources. The Canadian government has a fundamental political role to play in the development of
such an industrial strategy.
An industrial strategy which safeguards the existence of a
distinctive Canadian nationality should include the following
objectives:

the development of Canadian management skills required

to manage large business complexes at the international policy level;
the promotion of Canadian participation in ownership of all segments
of Canadian business; the removal of the limitations on the exports
of Canadian subsidiaries so as to develop Canadian expertise in the
export area specifically, and in the international business area
generally, and the encouragement of higher levels of research and
development in Canadian industry so as to increase substantially the
employment of Canadian scientific engineering, and technical support
personnel in Canada.
I submit that the Automobile Agreement undermines these
political interests and the development of the kind of industrial
strategy mentioned above. The Automobile Agreement encourages the
rationalization of the automobile industry in Canada on a continental
basis and so places the Canadian government in the position of only

Canada, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce,
Canada Year Book, Trade Value of Commodity (Ottawa, 197D, P- lOVj.

4
being able to maintain, through the production safeguards, the growth
of the automobile industry in Canada, rather than placing the government in a position to influence and encourage the growth and development of the automobile industry, not only in this country, but also
in the international marketplace.

The Canadian government must not

only be able to introduce legislation to encourage the political
interests and industrial strategy, which I have mentioned already, but
also the government must ensure that whatever policies it implements,
in either of these essential areas, can and will be carried out.
Bilateral trade arrangements such as the Canada-United States
Automobile Agreement represent a movement away from both the political
interests and the industrial strategy mentioned above, which are in
the long terra interest of the Canadian nation.

The degree of movement

away from these priorities in the specific case of the automobile
industry is difficult to gauge, but it is my intention to demonstrate
that the Automobile Agreement denies Canadians the freedom to set
their own priorities by denying the validity of the non-economic
motivations in Canada's political interest and industrial strategy.
The Automobile Agreement provided the conditions for duty— — • — — —

x
t

. p.

v

free trariehpt.wpFm the- two countries in most new vehicles and parts ^
to be used as original equipment.

The agreement was similar to other

bilateral trade arrangements between Canada and the United States,
such as the Defence Production Sharing Agreement of 1959« in that it

5
See the Appendix, for the formal text of the Automobile
Agreement. It should be noted that specialty items such as tubes,
tires, and automatic transmissions were excluded from duty free
treatment.

>1 "

included a provision to allow either party to abrogate the pact after
a twelve-rnonth notification.

It is the corollary conditions,

imposed by both countries, which have precipitated profound political
effects not only in the Canadian domestic context, but also in the
bilateral relations between Canada and the United States.
Canada established conditions in the Agreement which were
7
designed to influence the pattern of Canadian automotive production.
Under these conditions Canada accorded duty-free trade arrangements
only to manufacturers who met specific conditions.

The first of these

conditions was that to qualify as a manufacturer, the ratio of a manufacturer's vehicle sales to production must be at least seventy-five
percent, using an arbitrarily established "base year", which ran from
August 1, 1963 to July Jl, 1964.

The purpose of this condition was
9
to ensure continued production growth in Canada.
One further commitment *hich the Canadian government required

of the automobile manufacturers in this country was in the form of
the "letters of undertaking".

These "letters" committed manufacturers

to increase their value-added by an amount equal to sixty percent of

See the Appendix, for the formal text of the Automobile
Agreement,
7
See the Appendix: Annex "A".
c

To achieve duty free treatment under the terms of the Agreement, only a firm which achieved a ratio of Canadian vehicle production
to vehicle sales in Canada during each model year of at least seventyfive percent qualifies as a "manufacturer".
9
This was confirmed by D.S. Wood, (who, in 19&!?, * a s president
(of the Canadian Auto Parts Manufacturers Association) in a Memorandum
from the President to the Auto Parts Manufacturers Association (Canada),
May 1^+, I965. The memorandum was obtained from the files of
A.D. Hales M.P.

the growth of net sales in cars and fifty percent in commercial
vehicles.

Also included was a commitment by the Canadian manu-

facturers to increase their purchases and production in Canada by
a specific dollar amount which was divided as follows:

General

Motors | 121 million; Ford ft 7h million; Chrysler ft 33 million;
American Motors ft 11 million; and all others ft 21 million.

The

obligations set forth in these "letters" were to be fulfilled by
the end of the 1968 model year.

By the end of 1968, all of the auto-

mobile manufacturers in Canada had met the conditions of increasing
their rates of Canadian value-added according to their increases in
net sales and spent the amount required of them on increased purchases
and production.

The first two conditions remain in effect at this

time.
The only United States restriction was that imports from
Canada must have fifty percent North American content to qualify as
duty free.

This restriction was included to prohibit import entries

12
from third countries.

There was no American requirement that

importers be manufacturers only, indeed, any United States citizen,
private or corporate, was permitted to import automotive products
duty free, with the exception of the condition mentioned above.

In addition to the production-sales requirement, a
"manufacturer", in order to achieve duty free treatment, must produce
vehicles which have Canadian content, or value-added, at no less than
the absolute dollar amount of Canadian content achieved in the 1964
model year.
Interview with Bert Barr of the Department of Industry,
Trade and Commerce, August 3i 1972.
12
C.E. Beigie, The Canada-U.S. Automotive Agreement, An
Evaluation ('''ontreal, 1970), pp. V?-50.

Because of this rebtriction on imports from third countries, the

7

United States was obliged to apply for a waiver from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) which it subsequently
received.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade requires

countries which have signed the General Agreement to reduce duties
on certain imports from all countries, in return for concessions
from other potential importers.

If tne American government had

not received the waiver from G.A.T.T., the Automobile Agreement
would have been a violation of the most-favoured-nation principle
of the General Agreement on Tariffs- and Trade previously signed by
the United States. Canada, on the other hand, had no need for
making any similar provision since all automobile imports into
Canada were accorded duty free treatment as long as these imports
were carried out by a manufacturer meeting the two conditions already
mentioned.
Since the end of the Second World *ar, Canada and the United
States have developed compatible policies, particularly in their
economic and trade relationships. Some Canadians have begun to
decry this phenomenon during the last ten years; they fear that
integrated economic and trade relations with the United States leads
ultimately to the loss of Canadian political sovereignty.

The Auto-

mobile Agreement has encouraged and to some extent facilitated the
establishment of a North American automobile industry. The Automobile
Agreement does not, in itself, represent a step toward the loss of
Canadian political sovereignty. There is no question that the
Canadian government has the authority to pass any law it sees fit

8
which would affect the automobile industry in this country.

There may

be a question, however, as to whether such laws affecting the automobile
industry can be enforced and whether this process is helped or hindered
by the Automobile Agreement.

It is my intention in this analysis of

the political significance of the Agreement, to shed some light on these
questions.
I propose to examine the Automobile Agreement in the following
sequence: an historical analysis of the automobile industry in Canada
prior to 1965; an examination of the automobile industry's assessment
of the Agreement; the United States political assessment of the Agreement; the Canadian political assessment of the Agreement; and an
investigation of some political implications of the Agreement.
The second chapter includes a description of the automobile
industry prior to the signing of the Automobile Agreement in 19651
and of the political attempts made by the Canadian government prior to
1965 to revitalize

and expand the Canadian automobile industry. The

chapter dealing with the automobile industry's assessment considers the
influence that the industry had on the Canadian government during the
political planning process which culminated in the Canadian proposals
to the United States for a bilateral automobile trading agreement.
This chapter also illustrates the initial and continuing support of the
automobile manufacturers for and the automobile parts manufacturers
reservations about the Automobile Agreement, and an examination of the
United Auto Workers Union position with regard to the Agreement. The
chapter on the United States political perception of the Agreement
deals with reasons for the opposition of a number of United States
Senators and some executive officials to the Automobile Agreement.

9
The chapter dealing with the Canadian political perception of the
Agreement examines the reasons why the Agreement is considered to be
successful by many public figures and most public servants. Further,
this chapter examines some of the recent indirect pressure which has
been exerted by the United States to have the Agreement changed.
The chapter on the political implications of the Agreement reviews
the political decisions made by the Canadian government concerning
the ratification of the treaty in Canada. Further, I examine in this
chapter, the political effects the Automobile Agreement has had on the
general relationship between Canada and the United States and the
specific effect the Agreement has had and will likely have on the
trading relations between the two countries. Finally, the conclusion
will present this writer's judgments based on the preceding chapters.
Primary source material was the basis of my research to the
fullest extent possible.

I made extensive use of interviews while

collecting research material. Respondents were participants in the
negotiations and were candid in their discussion of the Automobile
Agreement.

I was particularly fortunate to obtain interviews with

Donald Thom, who is now an Assistant Deputy Minister in the Department
of Finance and with Bert Barr, who is an officer of the Automotive
Division of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce. Mr. Thom,
who was than an Assistant Deputy Minister in the Industry Department,
along with Simon Riesman, who was then Deputy Minister of Industry
and C.M.Drury, Minister of Industry in the federal Liberal government were primarily responsible for drawing up the Canadian proposals
for an Automobile Agreement in 1965 and they subsequently led the
Canadian negotiating team in its discussions with the Americans,

10
which came to fruition in the form of the Automobile Agreement.
Mr. Thorn was very forthright, perhaps because he is no longer
directly involved with the Automobile Agreement.
The American negotiating team was headed by Luther Hodges,
Secretary of Commerce, and by Henry Dempsey, Director of the Trade
13
Initiative Division of the Department of Commerce.

It is

interesting to note that the negotiation of the Automobile Agreement
was the last official act performed by these men. They were
replaced by John O'Connor and Robert McNeil on January 18, 19&5*
two days after the official signing of the Agreement. Mr. Hodges
and Mr. Dempsey knew that they would be leaving their respective
posts prior to January l8, 1965 so the Automobile Agreement was not
the reason for their departure.

There is no evidence that Mr. Hodges

or Mr. Dempsey were less expert in the negotiations than their
Canadian counterparts, but at the same time, the American delegates
knew that they would not be officially answerable for the Automobile
Agreement after its ratification, and therefore might have been less
vigilant than they might normally have been if they were going to
continue in office.
Mr. Barr has worked on the day to day operation of the
Automobile Agreement since 1967 and his comments were detailed.
Other interviews conducted with Hugh Beechey of General
Motors and Joel Shelley of Ford were interesting because both men
held not only roughly equivalent positions in the two companies,
13
Interview with D.C. Thorn, of the Department of Finance,
August 3, 1971.
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both are attached to the Public Relations Department of their
respective companies, but also held basically similar views about
the Automobile Agreement.

Arnold Wallace, who at the time of the

interview was Vice-President of Earl fiobinson Auto Parts of Oshawa,
was rather bitter about the effect the Automobile Agreement has had
on his company in particular, and the automotive parts industry
generally in Canada.

1 interviewed Mr. 'Wallace because of his

position in the automotive parts industry in Canada and because
I had been made aware that Mr. Wallace was dissatisfied with the
results of the Agreement as they affect his company.

His distaste

for the Agreement contrasted sharply with the views of Mr. Beechey
and Mr. Shelley who both felt that the Agreement was a boon to the
automobile industry in Canada.
A.D. Hales, Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament,
added a dissenting voice to the discussion concerning the Agreement.
As the most vocal critic of the Agreement at the time that it was
announced in 1965» Mr. hales' reflections were important for this
study.

Another key source of primary material was the six volume

file on the Automobile Agreement which Mr. hales has collected.
Mr. iiales allowed me access to the file, which included material that
he had received confidentially, as well as material he had presented
to the Progressive Conservative Caucus as the party's chief critic
of the Agreement.

I cannot overrate the usefulness of that material

in the preparation of this thesis.
I used the secondary material, for the most part, to fill in
such gaps as were left through my use of primary material

C.E. Beigie,

12
who is an international economist with the Irving Trust Company of
New York City, in his book, The Canada-U.S. Automative Agreement;
An Evaluation, provides the best general economic analysis of the
Agreement.

The report of the Standing Committee on Commerce of the

House of Commons, Automotive Products, describes the potential economic
benefits that were anticipated by the government in 196^. The Hearings
of the Committee on Finance of the United states Senate on the Automobile Agreement give an insight to the nature of the opposition of
some American Senators to the Agreement.

These documents, particularly,

were valuable as a complement to the primary material.
The research methods which I used caused some difficulty in
two respects.

First, the interview technique was difficult, in that

there seemed to be a tendency on the part of the people interviewed
to tell me what they thought 1 wanted to hear.

1 feel 1 overcame

this problem to some extent by asking several different kinds of
questions on the same topic. Second, I encountered some difficulty
in my research methods in that virtually all of the studies that
have been done on the Automobile Agreement have been from an economic
perspective.

In choosing to examine the Automobile Agreement

according to its political implications, I was confronted with the
advantage of having great latitude to collect and interpret research
material on the one hand, and the disadvantage of having no comparable
studies to examine on the other hand.

•CHAPTER

I

THE POLITICAL ADVENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE AGREEMENT
To gain a better understanding of the Canada-United States
Automobile Agreement of 1965* it is necessary to examine the nature
of the automobile industry in Canada and the background events which
immediately preceded the signing of the Automobile Agreement by
Prime Minister Pearson and President Johnson in Johnson City, Texas,
on January 16, 1965*
Neither before 1965, a n d certainly not after that date, has
the Canadian automobile industry been autonomous. This fact must be
stated unequivocably and its implications understood.

The automobile

industry in Canada constitutes a classic example of United States
direct investment in this country. By direct investment 1 refer,
according to A.E. Safarian's definition to, "a business operation
incorporated in Canada in which effective control of that operation's
voting stock is held by non-residents."

In the case of the automobile

industry effective control is held to the extent of ninety-seven
2
percent by non-residents, i.e. United States residents.
What are
the implications for Canada as the host for an industry which has
been completely foreign controlled for decades?

A.E. Safarian, Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industries
(Toronto, 1966), p. 2.
2
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Balance of International Payments 196?T 196**, 196$ (Ottawa, August 19&7) i P« 128.
13

Ik
In the first place Canada can expect only a very limited

I

development of her managerial resources since real control is held I
in Detroit, not in Oshawa arid Oakville.

Thus decisions which affect

the automobile industry in Canada are international in'the sense
that they are taken in the interest of the automobile industry
generally and have little to do with Canada's interest.

The auto-

mobile industry in Canada is headed by officers whose decisions fulfill
a managerial rather than an entrepreneurial function and which follow
general guidelines established in the United states'.
The Automobile Agreement accentuates the managerial function
of Canadian automobile executives as opposed to the entrepreneurial
function and so undermines the potential of the Canadian government
to promote the development of Canadian management skills for large
businesses at an international level. As a result of the Automobile
Agreement production decisions have been removed from the prerogatives
of Canadian managers.

For example, Ford of Canada has had no senior

executive in charge of production in Canada since 1965•

Another

result of the Agreement is that Ford of Canada plant managers report

5

functionally to their parent corporate officers in Dearborn, Michigan.
Similarly, as a result of the Automobile Agreement the elimination of
a number of managerial positions at Ford of Canada has been brought
about, with the responsibility of these positions going to officers
See A.E. Safarian, op.cit., pp. 50-88.
k

I.A. Litvak, Dual Loyalty:

Canadian-U.S. Business

Arrangements (Toronto, 1971), p. 152.
5

lbid.

15
of the parent company in Michigan.
A second implication, which is not directly related to the
Automobile Agreement is that the automobile industry in Canada,
because of its subsidiary nature, has a relatively limited export
franchise so that the Canadian subsidiary will not compete with its
7

United States parent in third countries.

Following this formula,

Ford of Canada may export its products to all Commonwealth countries
except the United Kingdom which is reserved for the parent company
in the United States as is the rest of the world except those areas
which may be delegated to a subsidiary in yet another country by the
United States parent. Obviously such a policy makes good corporate
c
sense; however, it is just as obvious that Canadian freedom of
trade is at least undermined, not in the formulation stage but in
the implementation stage, because of the control of the Canadian
subsidiary by the American parent.

For example, there was the case

of Ford of Canada's hesitation to export trucks to the Peoples
Republic of China in 1957 because this might have contravened the
United States "Trading with the Enemy Act".

In this instance not

only was Canada's freedom to trade subject to serious reservations
but also her sovereignty over her own foreign policy restricted, again
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 152.
n

A.E. Safarian, op.cit. , pp. 103-1*+^.

Q

Interview with Joel Shelley of Ford of Canada (Oshawa,
July t>, 1971). In Mr. Shelley's words, "It wouldn't make much
sense to compete against ourselves."

16
not in its formulation stages but in its implementation phase.

In the

typical cases mentioned above the problems arose basically because of
the wholly-owned-subsidiary nature of the automobile industry in
Q

Canada.

An important feature of the "Trading with the Enemy Act" is
its anticipatory nature.

There are not many instances in fact of

this type of restriction because Canadian subsidiaries of United States
parent corporations do not explore those export possibilities which
might bring about a negative United States government reaction if
these possibilities were to be pursued.
The Automobile Agreement reinforces the restrictions
mentioned above.

At the same time the Agreement, by reinforcing

trade restrictions on Canadian subsidiaries, limits the development
of an industrial strategy by the government which maximizes the
development of Canadian entrepreneurship through the removal of
export limitations on Canadian subsidiary business operations.
Thirdly, as a wholly-owned subsidiary operation, Ford of
Canada leaves virtually all of the research and development to its
foreign-owned parent.

Certainly the lack of research and develop-

ment facilities is not unique to the automotive industry in Canada,
indeed the lack of such facilities tends to be a common result of
foreign direct investment in Canada.

In the automobile industry

o
cf. A.E. Safarian, op.cit., p. lkk

and Canada, House of

Commons, Debates (Ottawa, December 18, 1957), p« 251^+.
See I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 69.
See A.E. Safarian, op.cit., pp. 168-200.
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the lack of research and development facilities in Canada perpetuates
the reliance of the Canadian subsidiary on its United States parent
while the technical and financial benefits which result from research
and development accrue almost totally to the United States economy.
A.E. Safarian, for example, points out that where the products of
the subsidiary and the affiliate are generally identical, such as
in the automobile industry, only one subsidiary firm in four does
any research at all.
Ford, for example, employs all its Canadian research and
development staff in Dearborn, Michigan.
12
and development staff in Canada.

Ford employs no research

The Automobile Agreement has

perpetuated this phenomenon in Canada* As a result of the Agreement,
Ford of Canada rationalized its production in Canada but "no research
and development unit was established in Canada to service the product
line on which specialization took place in Canada"13 since this need
could be met from resources in the United states. The point is that
the Automobile Agreement undermines the achievement of higher levels}
of research and development in Canada which allow for the increased j

Y
development of scientific, engineering, and technical personnel as
part of an overalll industrial strategy.

{ i

The Canadian government

cannot make the best use of this country's human resources if it
pursues policies such as the Automobile Agreement which undercuts the
potential for these Canadians to work on research and development in
their own country.
12
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 69.
15

lbid., p. 152.
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Finally, the financial policies of the automobile industry

j/

in Canada fail within the overall requirements of the parent United
States companies.

In the automobile industry in Canada these policies{
i

have meant, for example, that the subsidiary operations in Canada are '
often required to buy parts and services from its United Stated-based
parent even when other sources may exist in Canada.

Direct empirical

evidence is limited on this point due in large part to the very large
size of the automobile industry.

Mr. Beechey, of General Motors of

Canada pointed out that often the Canadian operation buys parts and
services jointly with its parent firm although these parts and
Ik
services will be used exclusively by the Canadian plant.

A.E.

Safarian maintains that purchases from the parent company increase
in proportion to the similarity of the products between the subsidiary
and the affiliate.15
Very often lower costs and familiarity with the parent's
supplies, especially in design-oriented products, are the main
reasons for a Canadian subsidiary buying through its parent.
A.J. Wallace of Earl Hobinson Automotive ^arts of Oshawa, pointed out
that even when a Canadian parts manufacturer produced a comparable
part (the only difference in some cases being the manufacturer's
name which is stamped on the part) at the same price as that manufactured in the United States, the Canadian automobile manufacturer
would as often as not continue to use the part which its parent had

lk

Beechey Interview, Oshawa, July 8, 1971.
15
A.E. Safarian, op.cit., pp. 147-167.
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A
always used.

l6

Mr. Shelley of Ford of Canada confirmed Mr. Wallace's statement; he noted that even when a Canadian parts manufacturer was able
to produce a part similar to the one already being used at about the
same price, which according to Mr. Shelley, happens very rarely,
Ford of Canada tends to stay with the part it has been using rather
than making changes in the delivery schedule and assembly line to
which Ford has become accustomed.

Perhaps most significant for our

purposes here, however, is that Mr. Shelley could not say that Ford
of Canada would definitely and on its own purchase new parts for its
assembly line which are superior in quality and comparable in cost
to those already being used, no matter where these new parts were
being manufactured.17
The Automobile Agreement strengthens the single market type
of operation described above. As this phenomenon develops the operation
of Ford of Canada tends to lose its financial integrity in the sense
that profits may be transferred to the parent corporation without the
benefits of ownership accuring to Canadians.

The evidence for this

/

likelihood is that Ford of Canada which sells its stocks to the
Canadian public, as opposed to General Motors of Canada which does not,
was 8l percent owned in 1969 by the parent firm

and the Ford family

as opposed to 7^.9 percent in 196^ before the Agreement came into
effect.

Therefore, the Automobile Agreement as a model of Canada-

Wallace Interview, Oshawa, August 12, 19717

Shelley Interview, July 5. 1971.

18
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 139.

20
United states economic integration works against the development of an
industrial strategy by the Canadian government which promotes Canadian
participation in ownership of all Canadian business.
The nature of the automobile industry in Canada, because it
is effectively a United States subsidiary and because of the integration within the industry itself, has provided for the extension
into Canada of American technical skills, management skills, product
innovation, and the need for capital to create and cultivate taste
formation through advertising.

There are advantages and disadvantages

in having this type of an operation in Canada.

I feel that the

disadvantages outweigh the advantages. The advantage of having this
type of an operation is that the Canadian automobile industry has
access to perhaps the most developed automobile industry in the world.
Having access to, and being directly affiliated with, the
United States-based automobile industry, however, means ultimately
that the Canadian automobile industry's potential is limited to
growth rather than real development.

The sharpening of Canadian

technical skills in the automobile industry will not be required
since the Canadian industry has access to all the new techniques
which are developed in the United States.

Canadian management skills

in the automobile industry are limited in scope. The Canadian manager
is left to increase the sales of an automobile product in the areas
for which he is responsible.

The Canadian president of a subsidiary

automobile manufacturing concern is unlikely ever to be in a position
to accept the blame for initiating the production of the Edsel or to
accept the credit for initiating the production of the Mustang. The
Canadian manager's job is primarily to sell these products. Because

21

the products of the Canadian and American automobile industries are so
similar, these products are advertised in very much the same way in
both countries. Potential Canadian automobile consumers are urged,
like their American counterparts, to "move up".

Despite the wide-

spread Canadian consumer acceptance of mid-size and compact cars, the
automobile industry in Canada tells Canadians to "move up" because
that is what its affiliate does in the United States, rather than
taking advantage of the widespread Canadian desire for economy cars.
None of thece features of the automobile industry in Canada are harmful
in themselves so long as Canadians and their government are satisfied
that it is enough for the automobile industry in this country to grow
according to American specifications rather than to develop the features
mentioned above according to particular Canadian needs.
The Automobile Agreement is instructive as a model indicating the
kinds if effects which result from economic integration between Canada
and the United States. The Canadian government cannot maintain, much
less direct, Canada's political nationality if development of the
economic growth of the country is directly related to a spin-off from
the United States economy.

The Automobile Agreement moves Canada in

exactly the direction of reliance on the spin-off effect of the United
States economy and so undermines the Canadian political nationality.
The automobile industry in Canada has not always been a
subsidiary operation.

The McLaughlin companies which began operation

in 1867» in Oshawa, Ontario, were Canadian pioneers in transportation
equipment. The wholly-owned and operated Canadian company began to

produce automobiles in the l890's.

The operation must have been

successful or General Motors of the United States would not have
offered R.S. McLaughlin the opportunity for a merger between the
two in 1918. Colonel K.S. McLaughlin was nothing if not a shrewd
businessman and the opportunity to join forces with a giant such
as General Motors is one that very few
would pass up.

Canadian, past or present,

Colonel McLaughlin retained his position as President

of the Canadian operation of General Motors after the merger and at
the same time received a position on the Board of Directors of the
American division of General Motors. Colonel McLaughlin retained
both of these positions until his death two years ago, which is an
example of the respect in which the man was held by his American
counterparts.
The purpose of this brief history of the automobile industry
in Canada is to demonstrate that the existence of this particular
industry is dependent upon north-south commercial ties or in other
words, access to the Lnited States market.

The McLaughlin experience

suggests that a Canadian automobile concern can exist only by having
access to the American market in addition to its share of the Canadian
market.

Colonel McLaughlin secured the survival of his own operation

in Canada and achieved access to the American market at the same time
by joining forces with the American-based General Motors in 1918.
The tradition of north-south ties between the automobile
industries of Canada and the United States has long since been established and the examples mentioned above illustrate the trend. The
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See James Dykes, Canada's Automotive Industry (Toronto,
1970), chapter 3.
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Automobile Agreement is evidence of the Canadian government's position
that the access by the Canadian automobile industry to the American
market is more important than the potential erosion of Canada's
national identity which is founded on east-west ties of commerce and
culture.

The government, through the Automobile Agreement, has so

committed the automobile industry in Canada to north-south integration
with its United States counterpart that not only is Canada's long term
political interest undermined but also the vitality of the industry
itself in Canada.

The Automobile Agreement, according to one description,

has left Ford of Canada's headquarters as "a merchandising shell housing
only the functions of finance, marketing and planning, industrial
relations, dealer affairs and public relations".

The Canadian govern-

ment may have acquired economic access to the United States automobile
market through the Automobile Agreement at the long term political
expense of Canada.

It is unlikely that the Automobile Agreement in

itself will bring about the political demise of Canada, the Agreement
does, however, undermine the validity of the east-west political axis
upon which this country is founded.
The negotiation of the Canada-United States Automotive Agreement was preceded by a series of circumstances which were in some ways
unique to the automobile industry and in other ways subject to circumstances which were imposed by well-intentioned Canadian governments on
the industry generally.

Dealing with the latter first, it would be no

understatement to say that the automobile industry in Canada prior to
1965 was profoundly affected by the tariff rates set on imports of

I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 152.

automobiles and parts by Canada's main customer, the United States.
In Canada, the import tariff rate from 1936 to 19&5

was

set at seventeen and one-half percent of the wholesale cost of the
item. This charge could be avoided on parts imported into Canada
if the Canadian content of these parts and manufacturing costs were
equivalent to sixty percent of the factory cost for cars and fifty
percent of the factory cost for commercial vehicles. A twenty-five
percent tariff was charged on major imported items, such as passenger
21
car engines and automatic transmissions.

Similarly, the finished

vehicles and parts which were manufactured in Canada and imported by
22
United States concerns were subject to roughly similar rates.

It

is not important to compare the tariff rates of the two countries;
however, it is important to note that the rationale behind the
application of a relatively high tariff rested on protecting Canada's
domestic industry.
There is a double irony in this rationale as it was applied
to the Canadian automobile industry by the Canadian government. In
the first place, if one is inclined to be cynical one could ask just
what industry there was to protect once Colonel MacLaughlin allied
his firm to the United States-based General Motors in 1918. In the
second place, the tariff has had the effect in many manufacturing
industries —

and the automobile industry is no exception — of

21
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., pp.11-20.
22
Ibid.

encouraging the type of branch plant operation of which Canadians
have become ever more acutely aware.
The imposition of a tariff by the Canadian government prior
to 196^ is evidence that the government was of the opinion that
economic policies which effectively kept foreign automobiles out of
Canada helped to achieve the objective of the growth and development
of the automobile industry in Canada.

The Automobile Agreement which

has replaced the tariff structure has limited the Canadian government to the achievement of growth alone in the automobile industry
in Canada in return for unlimited access to the United States market.
The Automobile Agreement is a precedent which works against the
implementation of wholly independent tax and monetary policies which
are designed to achieve the national objective of the growth and
development of all industry in Canada.

As far as the consumer was

concerned he knew that in Canada, prior to 196>, it cost him a great
deal more money to buy a new car than it did for his American counterpart and most Canadians seemed to accept this fatalistically.

Canadian

consumers have since then discovered that a Canada-United States
Automobile Agreement has made precious little difference in the higher
cost of their new automobiles as compared to the prices they would pay
for the car if they resided in the United states, since the Canadian
government has restricted the duty-free importation of automobiles to
manufacturers.
As for the automobile industry itself in Canada, two key
features distinguish the industry prior to 196i?:

the Canadian industry

23
See the Appendix, for the complete text of the Agreement.

was attempting to offer a full range of models which not only
eliminated cost reductions which might have been possible through
a high volume specialization in a few models and created difficulty
in establishing export markets since it was offering a more expensive
replica of a product already being produced in the United states.
Also, production inefficiency generally stood out as the main reason
for the fact that vehicle prices were ten percent higher in Canada

<^

prior to 1965 since employees in the automobile industry in Canada
were paid thirty percent less than the American counterparts and
since the return to capital was no higher in Canada than in the
United States.
The Automobile Agreement has led to high volume specialization
in the automobile industry in Canada, but not to the reduction of
retail vehicle prices in Canada to the point that they are the same
25
as the retail price of the same automobile in the United States.
On the other hand, the integration of the two industries through the
Automobile Agreement has brought about the demand for wage parity in
26
both countries

based on a common cost of living index.

The Auto-

mobile Agreement is not in the long term political interest of Canada
to the extent that it restricts the government from fulfilling
economic policies which are designed to achieve distinctly Canadian
wages.

2k
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., pp. 21-30.
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See the statement of John Turner, Minister of Finance in
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April 26, 1972), p. 1646.
See Walter Reuther, Wall Street Journal (New York,
June 2, 1967).

It is important to note the general political mood in Canada,
as well as some specific events which occurred immediately prior to
the signing of the Automobile Agreement in 1965. The general mood
in Canada was one of disquiet since the first official notice of
concern in Ottawa over the extent of United States ownership of
industry in Canada became manifest in the preliminary report of the
Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, published in 1956.
The Commission was headed by Walter Gordon who was to implement some
of the recommendations of the report as Minister of Finance in 1963«
The government commissioned V.W. Bladen, an economist at the University
of Toronto, to study the automobile industry in Canada.

The Bladen

pO

Commission made its report in 196l.
For the purposes of this study it is sufficient to note that
Bladen recommended that:

Canadian content in automobiles should be

expanded to include parts sold to foreign buyers (called extended
content); replacement parts production in Canada should be encouraged;
and all imported automotive items should have the same status instead
of giving special treatment to specific items such as automatic
29
transmissions.
Bladen's cardinal concern simply was good cost
performance for the automobile industry as it operated in Canada.
Rather than following the recommendations of the one-man
27
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Canada's
Economic Prospects (Ottawa, 1956).
28
See Canada, The Report of the Royal Commission on the
Automobile Industry, (Ottawa, 196l).
29
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Bladen Commission, the government established its own program which
consisted of two "duty remission" plans. A partial program was
30
established in October 1962, and a full program was implemented,
31
albeit for a short duration, in October 1963.

In each case the

plan provided that only a manufacturer of automobiles, and not a
parts manufacturer, was eligible for the duty refund.

Before going

into the reasons why the second plan survived only for five months
- until March, 196*f - it is necessary to compare the two plans to
get an understanding of their effect on the industry as well as the
direction the Canadian government hoped that the automobile industry
would take, prior to the Automobile Agreement itself.
The Bladen Report and the Duty Remission Plans were similar
in that they were designed to create a more efficient and effective
industry by removing tariffs on imports by rewarding export performance.
Also both schemes provided an incentive for replacement parts production.
There were, however, differences between the two programs.

Bladen's

plan would have probably led to some degree of increased efficiency

For the text of this plan see, Canada, Order in Council:
Privy Council Office (Ottawa, P.C. 1962 - I/I536).
31
For the text of this plan see, Canada, Order in Council;
Privy Council Office (Ottawa, P.C. 1963 - 1/15M0.
The first duty
remission plan implemented by the Canadian government required that
a twenty-five percent duty be collected on automatic transmissions.
This duty could, however, be reclaimed from the Canadian Customs
Department as $ 1.00 was returned for each $ 1.00 increase in the
Canadian content of parts. There were no United States objections
(from the government nor the automobile industry) to this plan which
was in effect from November, 1961, until the end of October, 1962.
The second duty remission plan was essentially an extension of the
first. The second plan was to be a full duty remission program which
would have required a $ 1.00 refund on any new vehicle and original
parts for $ 1.00 of Canadian content in parts and vehicle exports over
and above the base level established during the first plan which, as
has been mentioned, ran from November 196I until the following October,

29
but not to integration, while the duty remission plans provided for
cost reductions which were average cost reductions and which were
based on tariff savings.

Further, the Bladen recommendations would

likely have had little effect on the Canada-United States automotive
trade balance, while it is likely that the duty remission plans
(especially the second one) would have decreased the Canadian deficit.
The second duty remission plan was short-lived as a firm in
Wisconsin, the Modine Manufacturing Company, requested that countervailing duties be applied by the United States on those parts
exported from Canada into the United States under the terms of
32
section 303 of "the United States Custom Act, 1930".

The Canadian

government dropped the duty remission plan before the countervailing
duties were applied and even before Modine brought its case before the
courts.

In fairness, however, it should be pointed out that the plan

was becoming a critical issue in Canadian-American trade relations
by March of 196^. The complaint of the Modine Company was the only
one which became public although it seems safe to assume that there
were other complaints from other American manufacturers since the
United States government was apparently prepared to apply countervailing duties in response to the Canadian plan.
The favourable disposition of the United States government
32
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., p. 39. It should be noted that this
crucial question in Canada-United States trade relations, - whether
making one country's tariffs on imports a function of export performance automatically effects the imposition of countervailing sanctions
by the other country, - has never been fully tested in the courts
of either country.

, 3°
towards the complaints of its manufacturers against the Canadian
duty remission plans and its apparent preparedness to test the
complaint of the Modine Company in the courts with a view of
obtaining legal sanction for the application of countervailing
duties was probably the reason for the short life of the second
plan.

Because of the negative response of the United States

government to the Canadian government's attempt to reduce the
Canadian deficit in automobile trade with the United States through
the means of duty remissions, the Canadian government felt it had
no alternative but to seek some other means favourable to the
American government which would achieve the effective reduction of
the Canadian deficit in automobile trade. Also, with the removal
of the second plan, Canada was again in the position of having to
reduce costs below United States costs to overcome the American tariff
and so open the North American market to the Canadian
industry.

automobile

It was with this in mind that Canada and the United States

negotiated a contract in their trade relations as these pertain to
the automobile industry which became known after 196^ as the CanadaUnited States Automobile Agreement.
In early October, 196^, the first meetings took place between
the government and the automobile industry in Canada which culminated
in the Canadian proposals for the Automobile Agreement with the United
States.

The cabinet minister most directly involved in the plan in

October and later in the negotiations
C M . Drury, then Minister of Industry.

with the United States was
The public service negotiators

Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971•

31
were headed by Simon Reisman, then Deputy Minister of the Department
of Industry.

The automobile industry was represented by the "big

four" Canadian manufacturers, as well as the Automotive Parts
Manufacturers Association.35

At this point in the formulation1 of
of

36
the Agreement, the government requested secrecy from all involved.'
Mr. Barr and Mr, Thorn both indicated that there was no secrecy
involved in the negotiations.

It is my conclusion that they were

referring to the negotiations with the United States and not to the
negotiations which D.S. Wood, President of the Automotive Parts
Manufacturers Association, mentioned in his memorandum to members of
the Association.

The meetings between the groups were extensive.

Mr. Wood indicated that:
At least fifteen meetings were held by the Automotive Parts
Manufacturers Association with Mr. Drury and his staff prior
to the announcement of the new U.S./Canada Automotive Agreement on January 15, 1965• Correspondence and telephone conversations were on a day to day basis.-''
An interview with D.C. Thorn was most useful in filling in the
background details which influenced Canadian thinking prior to
January 15, 1965*

Mr. Thorn indicated that there were two key

34
Thorn Interview, August 3. 1971• Mr. Thorn indicated that the
key initiatives were taken by the Department of Industry although the
departments of Finance, Trade and Commerce, and Labour, to a lesser
extent, were also involved.
35
Evidence of the role of the parts manufacturers was
obtained from the files of A.D. Hales M.P., in the form of a memorandum
to the Automotive Parts Manufacturers Association, from D.S. Wood, the
President of that Association. See D.S. Wood, Memorandum from the
President to the Automotive Parts Manufacturers Association (Canada)
(Toronto, May Ik, 1965).
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circumstances which influenced the Canadian desire to reach an agreement.

Both the government and the industry wanted automobile production

in Canada to become more efficient. After the call for countervailing
duties by the Modine Company, the Canadian and United States governments were determined to arrive at some plan which would have allowed
the greater efficiency which the duty remission plans (albeit on a
limited scale) were also designed to accomplish as well as reducing
38
the Canadian deficit in automobile trade.'
1
The new plan also took into account the "Canadian Mood,.,39

which Mr. Thorn described as the first noticeable rumblings of concern
by government over the extent and implications of United States ownership of Canadian industry.

Since automobile manufacturing is completely

foreign owned, the new plan was formulated with the idea of maintaining
a specific degree of Canadian influence on the industry as a whole.
In short, the new plan was concerned with effecting market efficiency,
while maintaining Canadian influence since, as one respondent said,
"Canada just doesn't have a car".

Through the Automobile Agreement

the Canadian government hoped to increase efficiency in the automobile
industry in Canada and to reduce the deficit in Canadian automobile
trade with the United States by allowing Canadian automobile manufacturers to integrate their operations with their American parent
firms subject to the fulfillment of the two provisions previously
mentioned.

5

39

Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971.
Ibid.
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D.C. Thorn indicated that the public service felt by the end
of L^bk

that increased efficiency in the Canadian automobile industry

and a reduction in Canada's automotive trade deficit could best be
achieved through partial integration of the Canadian and American
industries and that if anticipated opposition to such a scheme was
overcome in Cabinet, it would be desirable to avoid the double
jeopardy of a full and potentially hostile debate before parliament
which, conveniently for the government, was not in session at the
kl
time the treaty was signed.
The Automobile Agreement was implemented in 1965 by Orderin-Council.

Mr. Thorn indicated that the Liberal government had no

special reason for using an Order-in-Council other than to say that
this was "standard parliamentary procedure".

k2

It should be pointed

out that this procedure allowed the Canadian government to implement
the Agreement without reference to Parliament.

Mr. Thorn would not

suggest that this disquiet over foreign ownership in Canada was not
a factor in the decision to bring the Agreement into effect without
a debate in Parliament.
interview with an

It is my conclusion, however, based on an

Opposition member, that it was precisely because

of the concern over foreign ownership that the government chose to
use an Order-in-Council to bring the Automobile Agreement into effect.
A.D. "ales pointed out that he felt his charge that the Automobile

kl
Thorn Interview, August 3t 1971Ibid.
^Ibid.
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Agreement was a sell-out would have carried more weight if it had
been brought out repeatedly during the course of a lengthy debate
which a minority government would have difficulty regulating.
The government anticipated the political reaction of the Opposition
which was of a damning nature to say the least.
The best way for a minority government to achieve a
modified free trade arrangement and to survive opposition pressure,
was to reduce to a minimum the length of time it is subjected to
charges of selling the national economic birthright. An Order-inCouncil was the pragmatic means by which the government achieved
both its desired ends.
There is one other detail concerning the negotiations between
Canada and the United States which remains unresolved.

It has been

46
suggested

that the United States agreed to the terms of the Auto-

mobile Agreement in return for the Canadian assurance that the recommendations made by a Royal Commission headed by Senator Gratton
O'Leary regarding advertising in Time and Reader's Digest magazines

Hales Interview, Ottawa, February 1&, 1971.
45
Ibid., A.D. Hales maintains that the Automobile Agreement
represents the sale of Canada's "political birthright".
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not be implemented.

Senator O'Leary's commission, which reported in

196l, recommended that the expenditures on advertising placed in the
Canadian editions of publications such as Time and Header's Digest
should no longer be tax deductible.

Henry R. i.uce, the editor-in-

chief of Time, contributed to this recommendation when he told the
O'Leary Commission that in no way did he consider Time to be a
Canadian magazine.

In January, I961?. the Canadian Cabinet debated

whether the recommendation should be implemented.

According to one

journalistic account, when the American Department of State heard of
these deliberations, it put direct pressure on the Cabinet by stating
that if the two publications were not exempt from tax in Canada
hi
"congressional approval of the Auto Fact would be placed in jeopardy".
It is known that Mr. Luce and Dean Husk, who was United States
Secretary of State at this time, were very close friends so the
source of the pressure by the American government seems apparent.
The American pressure influenced the Cabinet to decide with
C.M. Drury that Time and Header's Digest should be exempt from the
recommended advertising tax.

Mr. Drury was being very pragmatic

in arguing before the Cabinet for an exemption for the magazines since
Reader's Digest is published in Mr. Drury's constituency of Westmount,
and since he was the minister responsible for the Canadian half of the
Automobile Agreement.

The Cabinet decided with Mr. Drury that there

would be no Automobile Agreement if it decided to tax the advertising

kl

See P.C. Newman, The Distemper of our Times (Toronto, 1968),
p. 225.
W.L. Gordon, A Choice for Canada:
Independence (Toronto, 1966), p. hH.

Colonial Status or
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in Time and Reader's Digest. Walter Gordon, who. was Mr. Drury's cabinet
colleague at the time of the Auto Pact negotiations between Canada
and the United states, points out that "approval of the Automobile
Agreement mipht have been jeopardized if a serious dispute had
arisen with Washington over Time".

In my interview with D.C. Thorn,

he categorically denied that the Auto Pact was part of a bargain
50
which also involved the dropping of the O'Leary recommendations.
Although I thought at the time that Mr. Thorn was rather too defensive
in answering this question, I might have discounted these suggestions,
since Thorn was closely involved with the negotiations, if I had not
received a diametrically opposite viewpoint from another source.
Bert Barr of the Deparmtnet of Industry, Trade and Commerce, said
that such a trade off "not only makes sense, but also is very
conceivable".51
My conclusion is that while "this trade off probably was not
mentioned directly over the bargaining table, it is more than likely
that the Canadians were made aware informally that the Americans
would be in a better frame of mind to negotiate the Automobile Agreement if the O'Leary recommendations were shelved.
background that the

It was against this

Canada-United States Automobile Agreement was

arranged through formal intergovernmental discussions and then jointly
announced, as has been mentioned above, on January 15* 1965*

^9
W.L. Gordon, op.cit. Paul Martin and Maurice Sauve
supported Mr. Drury's position in Cabinet discussions on this matter.
Thorn Interview, August 3« 1971*
51
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The Canadian government hoped to achieve several immediate
effects by negotiating and ratifying the Automobile Agreement. The
first of these was, of course, to eliminate the United States tariff
on Canadian automotive exports, as well as the Canadian rebates which
had previously brought about the threat of American countervailing
duties.

Further, the Canadian government saw the Agreement as the

first step toward the removal of various structural barriers which
had hindered efficient production.

,

The government felt that the

Agreement would eliminate the barriers of large inventories, unreliable supply, and result in larger production runs of fewer models so
that the industry could then achieve economies of scale.

A long term

effect which the government hoped to achieve through the Agreement was
the achievement of what has been called a "fair and equitable share"
of the North American automotive market. Although there are several
interpretations as to what exactly the above phrase means, D.C.Thorn
indicated that the government was concerned in this instance with the
continuing growth in production of the automobile industry in Canada.53
The immediate effects were achieved as the Agreement went into effect
and growth in production has occurred but not without substantial
repercussions in Canada.

Production has grown for two main reasons.

First, the Canadian automobile industry now has unlimited access to
the American market, without duty being charged.

Second, in several

cases the automobile manufacturers in Canada now produce for a

Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971*
55
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North American market.

For example, American Motors produces its

Hornet model for eastern Canada and the eastern United states at
Brampton, Ontario.

The Hornet is also manufactured at Kenosha,

Wisconsin, for customers in western Canada and the western United
States.
Political opposition to the Automobile Agreement at the
time it was announced was limited indeed for two reasons.

One of

these has already been mentioned, namely, that in bringing the
Agreement into effect by Order-in-Council the government was able to
avoid any debate in Parliament over the merits or demerits of the
Agreement.

The second reason for the lack of political opposition was

that the initial reaction to the potential economic benefits was
favourable.

The Globe and Mail editorialized that the Agreement

"offers important benefits to the people of both countries and to the
automobile industries of both countries".

Similarly, the Toronto

Daily Star stated that the "benefits of the Agreement are clear and
obvious to Ottawa".55

The Montreal Gazette concurred that the
%
"agreement allows for new growth",
and the Winnipeg Free Press

expressed the hope that the benefits which accrued to the manufacturers
because of the Agreement would be "passed on to the consumer".57
5k
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In li^ht of this response favouring the economic benefits of
the Agreement, it is perhaps not surprising that the Conservative
critic, A.D. Hales'charged before Parliament that the Agreement

58 by the government caused so

represented "a complete sell out"
little interest.

Heid Scott M.P., the New Democratic Party critic

of the Agreement prior to 1968, did not object to the Agreement
because of its integrative character, as one might have expected
from an N.D.P. critic, but rather because the Agreement was
implemented only with'"the concurrence of parliament"59 rather than
through a full debate before parliament.
The government has also had to deal with some problems as a
result of this rationalization process. The government set up a
program of Transitional Adjustment Benefits (T.A.B.) in August, 1965«
to assist manufacturers and employees while the rationalization process
was continuing.

The automobile manufacturers and parts producers used

the T.A.B. program to retool, and in some cases
duction processes.

redesign,their pro-

Government benefits were also available to workers

who had to move their homes or who were otherwise disrupted as a
result of the rationalization process carried on after the Automobile
Agreement went into effect.

From 1965 until June,

19711 the Canadian

government had paid out over & 85 million in Transitional Adjustment
Benefits to manufacturers who have altered their production and to
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(Ottawa, March J l , 1965)1

p . 13005.
Canada, House of Commons, Debates
1965), P. IIV58.

(Ottawa, February l 8 ,

families who have altered their lives as a result of the Agreement.
Conservative critic A.D. Hales supported the announcement
of the T.A.B. benefits and indicated that C M . Drury, the Minister
of Industry, had no choice but to introduce such a program since the
Automobile Agreement had put Canadian parts manufacturers "in such a
terrible position that something had to be done to help them
survive".

The N.D.P. critic, Reid Scott, supported the concept

of the T.A.B. program because it offered financial support to automotive workers who were dislocated as a result of the Agreement.
Nevertheless Mr. Scott criticized the plan for two reasons. First
of all, he said that the automotive worker should not be expected to
62
contribute "the major portion of the cost"
of the plan. This
position is not surprising considering that labour unions are an
important source of funds to the New Democratic Party.

Second,

Mr. Scott complained that the benefits paid to Canadian workers were
not equivalent to those being paid to American workers who were dis-
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located by the Agreement.

This position is interesting, not because

the N.D.P. critic was demanding increased benefits for Canadian workers,
but rather because it does not question the political implications
effected by the integrative character of the Automobile Agreement.
60
Jean-Luc Pepin, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce;
Press Release -17-16-70,(Ottawa, June 1970).
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, June 28, 196^),
p. 2908.
62
Ibid., p. 2911.
5
63,
lbid.
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As the Canadian government must have expected, the big four
of the automobile industry set up their production operations on a
North American basis. This more integrated operation dulls further
what little distinction there had been between the Canadian and
American automobile industries and encourages more centralized
decision-making from the United States head offices of the automobile
manufacturers. The Automobile Agreement indicates that the Canadian
government sees the branch plant operations of United States manufacturers as the best means of automobile production in Canada.
The Automobile Agreement promotes further integration of the Canadian
and American automobile industries and so encourages overall production
decisions affecting the automobile industry in Canada to be made in
head offices in the United States.
In fact, without the production safeguards which Canada
added to the Agreement, it is conceivable that all of Canada's automobile requirements would be met by production carried on solely in
the United States.

The government has, through a political decision,

elected not only to perpetuate the branch plant production of
automobiles in this country, but also to allow the automobile manufacturers to refine these operations to their advantage through
centralized decision-making, which is subject only to indirect Canadian
political influence. For example, as a result of the Agreement, the
Chrysler Corporation now manufacturers its Dodge Dart in Canada
according to the North American demand for this particular model.
If the American sales of the Dart were to fall, the evidence suggests
that Chrysler could cut back on the production of these cars regardless

of the Canadian demand for them and of the Canadian workers employed
in making, thera. '60 long as Chrysler continues to fulfill the overall
terms of the Agreement, the Canadian government is limited to
requesting that Chrysler's head office in the United States reconsider
such a decision.

It is in this way that the Automobile Agreement can

restrict the Canadian government's influence on the automobile industry
in this country.
If one assumes that the economic interest of the automobile
industry is always, or usually, in the best political interest of
the country there would be no dispute over the value of the Automobile
Agreement in Canada.

We have already seen, however, that the economic

interests of the automobile industry are very often not in the political
interest of the country, nor in the interest of the development of a
far-reaching industrial strategy of this country.

The Automobile

Agreement, therefore, denies the validity of the pursuit by the
Canadian government of the kind of political interests and industrial
strategy which I feel will promote the political and economic integrity
of Canada in the future.

CHAPTER

II

THE POLITICAL INPUT OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
TO THE AUTOMOBILE AGREEMENT
This section is devoted to an examination of the Canadian
automobile industry's assessment of the Automobile Agreement both
before and after the signing of the Agreement and the input the
industry has had with regard to the Canadian half of the Agreement.
For the purpose of this study, the "big four" auto manufacturers,
the parts manufacturing industry, and the automobile labour union,
(the United Auto Workers) comprise the automobile industry in Canada.
I will discuss the role of these three main segments of the industry
in that order.
As the result of my investigation there is no doubt that the
Canadian automobile manufacturers - General Motors, Ford, Chrysler,
and American Motors - were the strongest influence which encouraged
the Canadian and United States governments to negotiate the Automobile
Agreement.

The evidence supporting this notion is substantial, and it

should be stated at the outset that the manufacturers' political
influence must not be under-rated.

However, because that influence

has been so great the Canadian government finds itself in a position

Interviews were conducted with representatives of General
Motors of Canada and Ford of Canada. See Beechey Interview, July 8,
1971, and Shelley Interview, July 5, 1971.
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which is less than advantageous.

The government, as a result of

the Agreement, has given up its direct influence on the automobile
industry in Canada by agreeing to a North American basis of automobile
production.
The Agreement ensures a certain level of automobile production
in Canada (based on the 1964 model year) and also invites further
integration of the Canadian and American automobile industries. One
result of this increased integration, as described in Chapter I, is
that the locus of decision-making for the automobile industry has
shifted to head offices in the United States. Therefore, decisions
with regard to the operation of the automobile industry in this country
are now made in the United States. The Canadian government can only
effectively influence the automobile industry in this country by
dealing with foreign executives in a foreign country.

The United

States government, on the other hand, can directly influence the
automobile industry in that country since the locus of decisionmaking for that industry rests effectively in the United States.
The automobile industry and the government both see the
Automobile Agreement as a vehicle to achieve increased efficiency
and rationalization in the manufacture of automobiles in Canada.
Indeed, Joel Shelley

of Ford of Canada, Hugh Beechey of General

Motors of Canada and Bert Barr of the Department of Industry, Trade
and Commerce used exactly the same phrase when they declared that
the agreement had successfully overcome the problem of "short
production runs".

Similarly, Mr. Beechey and D.C. Thorn, of the

2
cf. Barr Interview, August 3, 1971. Shelley Interview,
July 5, 1971; and Beechey Interview, July 8, 1971.

Department of finance, used exactly the same phrase when describing
another hoped for effect of the Agreement, namely that the automobile industry in Canada would cease to be a "costly duplication
in miniature of its counterpart in the United States".
extent this latter objective has also been realized.

To some
I cite these

examples of similar phraseology which portray the common thinking
of the individuals mentioned above, to indicate that there was and
is more than chance agreement among the government and industry
regarding the general accomplishment of the Automobile Agreement.
The terms efficiency and rationalization are generally used to
define the objectives and working-nature of the Agreement and the
four men mentioned above not only agreed on the use of these terms
in describing the Agreement, but also defined them in the same way.
The manufacturers have a further indirect, though substantial,
influence which the government could not ignore before 196^+ anymore
than it can ignore that influence now.
Canada paid i l}k

The Ford Motor Company of

million in sales and income taxes in 1968, and

produced at the same time a ft ^0.2 million profit after taxes.

It

should be remembered that the General Motors operation in Canada is
roughly two-fifths as large again compared to Ford using the Letters
of Undertaking as a measure. These two giants combined still leave
one-quarter of the automobile market in Canada to Chrysler, American
Motors and others, such as Volkswagen and Toyota.
3
cf. Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971; and Beechey Interview,
July 8, 1971.
"Report on Business", Toronto Globe and Mail, February 8,
1969.

The industry also has a further influence. The

automobile

industry in Canada exported, in the first nine months of 1970,
j> 2.6 billion worth of finished products, as well as engines and
parts.

5

That total seems to be increasing yearly although complete

recent statistics were not available at the time of writing. The
automobile industry as a whole was Canada's largest exporter in
1970.

It seems obvious then that the automobile industry, given

its economic clout, would be misguided not to try to influence the
government to negotiate an Agreement which would be beneficial to
the industry and to the government in terras of immediate export and
balance of payments statistics but at the expense of Canadian
political control over decision-making within the industry and long
term options affecting the industry.
By the same token, the Canadian government, dependent as it
is on exports, and realizing the size of tax revenue it collects
from the industry, would be foolish not to listen to the representations of the automobile industry.
than satisfied the manufacturers.

The Automobile Agreement more
As the past president of Ford

of Canada, K.K. Scott, stated on February 2, 1969 to the Canadian
Club of Ottawa:

"... we strongly endorse the autopact as a model

for government-industry collaboration and we advocate for it a
permanent place in the fabric of our industry".

Roy Bennett, who

"Report on Business", Toronto G^obe and Mail, November 11,
1970. The Globe and Mail arrived at this figure from a computation
of tables published by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.
K.E. Scott, A Speech to the Canadian Club (Ottawa,
February 2, 1969).

succeeded Mr. Scott in November, 1970, and who was heavily involved
7
in the Automobile Agreement, agrees: "It has been a very healthy
thing for all the companies and the economy as a whole".
It would be unlikely indeed that the manufacturers could be
unhappy with the Agreement in view of the fact that the mutual
objectives, (which they hold with the government), of "efficiency"
and "rationalization" have been partially realized through the
Agreement.

Certainly production runs in Canada are longer, thus

meeting the requirement given above since production decisions are
now geared to North American needs. This is evidenced by the fact
that sixty percent of the vehicles produced in Canada in 1968 were
exported to the United States as compared to seven percent in 1964.
During 1968 vehicle imports from the United States accounted for
forty percent of the Canadian market as compared to three percent
in 1964.9
At the same time the Agreement has permitted rationalization
within each' company.

Mr. Shelley pointed out that Ford now produces

its model line Maverick for "eastern North America" in

Canada, while

the needs of "western North America" are met at Ford's plant in
Michigan.

Obviously there is little chance for duplication to

9

Joel Shelley confirmed that Mr. Bennettwas the key spokesman
for Ford of Canada to the Canadian government while the latter was
formulating its position on the proposed policy for the automobile
industry.
Shelley Interview, July 5, 1971*
o

"Report on Business", Toronto Globe and Mail, November 19, 19
q
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., pp. 77-96.
Shelley Interview, July 5» 1971•
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occur in Canada, much less North America, using this kind of
production scheme. This particular scheme is not general to the
industry but it is an example of the concrete application of the
definition and the kind of rationalization which the industry and
the government hoped to achieve through the Agreement.

There is

strong evidence that the influence of the automobile industry on the
government prior to the signing of the Agreement was pervasive.
Officers of the automobile industry such as Roy Bennett, ^resident of
Ford of Canada, and D.S. Wood, President of the Automotive Parts
Manufacturers Association of Canada and government officials such as
Mr. Thorn and Mr. Barr, are in agreement not only in what they see as
the objectives of the Agreement, but also in the terms by which they
describe thoue objectives.
That the automobile manufacturers in Canada and the United
States have been silent during the discussions which have taken place
between Canadian and American government officials with regard to
changing the Agreement, indicates to me that the automobile industry
has the kind of trading arrangement that it wants. There is no doubt
that the government was more than aware
market power,

of the industry's original

the industry's power over prices paid and charged, as

well as the ability to obtain more than normal profits. Mr. Thorn made
this amply clear when he indicated that General Motors set the price
of its vehicles last, to which the other manufacturers adjust, in order
11
cf. D.S. Wood, op.cit., (May Ik, 1965); "Report on Business",
Toronto Globe and Mail, November 1970; Thorn Interview, August 3i 1971;
and Barr Interview, August 3, 1971. D.S. Wood, for example pointed out
that conversations by telephone and letter between the automobile
industry and the government were on a day to day basis from October
1964 through December 1964.

^9
to keep American Motors in business and thereby avoid any government
scrutiny under anti-trust provisions in the United States or through
12
the Combines Investigation Act in Canada.

With this kind of auto-

mobile industry power in mind, the government decided that duty free
status would apply only to Canadian manufacturers who met the sales
to production ratio and Canadian value-added provisions. These
"safeguards", as they have been called, were and are designed to
regulate the market power which the industry has.
The manufacturers for their part have not criticized the
Canadian government's attempt to regulate vehicle production and employment related to that production in this country.

Mr. Bennett,

President of Ford of Canada, states flatly that the desire for changes
in the Automobile Agreement "does not have its origins in automobile
industries on either side of the border which are happy with the
results of the Agreement".13
The automobile industry is very happy indeed.

The Agreement

it influenced, notwithstanding the safeguards which the Canadian government included, has gone a long way toward helping to achieve exactly
those goals of rationalization and efficiency which the automobile
industry in this country considers vital. These goals are vital to
the industry simpLy because they allow the manufacturers to produce
automobiles more cheaply in this country and so make a larger profit.
To ensure the continued production of automobiles in Canada, the government restricted the duty free importation of automobiles to manufacturers
12
Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971.
"Reports on Business", Toronto Globe and Mail, November 19,
1970.
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who met specific production standards (ie. the production safeguards)
and thereby made concessions which may not be in this country's
political interest.
The government has conceded its independent tax policy on
the importation of automobiles to this country and the revenue that
policy generated in order to underwrite the existence of automobile
manufacturers in Canada on the questionable assumption that the
objectives of these manufacturers will naturally be coincident with
Canadian national objectives.
The government, by negotiating the Automobile Agreement, has
facilitated the integration of the Canadian automobile industry with
its United States counterpart to the economic benefit of the industry
in Canada.

As the process of integration is carried out, however,

there is a tendency for the operation of the Canadian subsidiary to
become further subordinated to that of its American parent with the
net result oeing that the United States government is able to exercise
political control over the actions of the automobile companies to the
extent that they operate within a continental framework.

The integ-

ration of the Canada and American economies in the automobile industry
clearly involves a threat to Canada's political sovereignty as the
distinction between the Canadian subsidiary operation and the United
States parent operation dulls and as the locus of decision-making for
a North American industry rests almost exclusively with tne parent firm
in the United States.
The existence of the Automobile Agreement did not inhibit the
United States government from extending the benefits of the DISC
program to the automobile manufacturers in that country. Similarly

51
Ford and Chrysler showed no reluctance to take advantage of the DISC
scheme despite the assertion of the Canadian Minister of Industry,
Trade and Commerce that by doing so these companies had violated
Ik
the Automobile Agreement.
The United States government is able to offer tax benefits
to its resident automobile manufacturers with the knowledge that
these benefits will not only be attractive to the latter and vicariously
to the American economy, but also that these corporate citizens are
more likely to make use of these tax benefits since a greater share
of the decision-making for the automobile industry has shifted to
the United States because of the integration which has occurred in the
North American automobile industry as a result of the Agreement.
The changes in the operation of Ford of Canada, which have
occurred since the Automobile Agreement came into effect, illustrate
the nature of the integration which has developed generally in the
automobile industry and the vicarious political threat posed to
Canadian political decision-making that integration in the industry
has brought about.
Since the inception of the Automobile Agreement, the managers
of Ford of Canada's assembly plants now meet production standards
set in the United States where formerly they reported to the senior
executive in Canada.

The result is that the operation of the

Ik
A more complete description of the impact of the DISC
program will occur in the next two chapters.
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., pp. 67-70.
Ibid., p. 67.
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industry in Canada is further truncated.

Purchasing for Ford,

since the Agreement, has been carried out on a North American basis
and some Canadian executives involved in this field now perform their
duties in Michigan rather than Ontario.

17

furthermore, virtually all

exporting is now handled by Ford's parent company and since 1965 all
foreign business is referred to it.

All research and development

done by Ford is centred in the United States as a result of the
Agreement and Canadian tax and government incentives have not brought
about a change in this policy.

19

i?ord of Canada still recruits and

promotes its own managers, but due to the closer ties between subsidiary and parent as a result of the Agreement, Ford-U.S. now
scrutinizes senior Canadian appointments and Ford of Canada executives
who are in line for the most important Canadian management positions
are acquainted with Ford's worldwide operations.
From the above discussion, it is obvious that the most important
decisions for the operation of Ford in Canada are made in the United
States and that this is a direct result of the integration brought
about by the Automobile Agreement,

The Canadian government has

lessened substantially its ability to exercise political control over

17
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 69.
1g
Ibid. By 1970 fifty Canadians were employed in research and
development activity but at Ford's plant in Dearborn, Michigan.
Af.D. Compton, executive director of Ford's research staff at Dearborn
has said that company's research areas since 19&5 have become too
interdependent to be separated geographically.
19

ibid.

20-rv,-,.
Ibid.
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the actions of an automobile company operating on a continental
basis where decisions made by that company eminate almost completely
from a head office in the United states
Thus, in this important section of the Canadian economy,
decisions concerning what is to be produced, where it is to be sold,
from whom supplies are to be purchased and what funds are to be
transferred, as well as charges for management, research, advertising
services and the like, are made outside Canada according to the
global strategy of foreign-based automobile manufacturers. Therefore,
while the country is richer on the short term basis, the Canadian
economy is less flexible in the long run and the instruments of public
policy are constrained by this kind of formal commitment which arises
from a bilateral arrangement, such as the Automobile Agreement, with
the government of the United States.
The Canadian automobile parts manufacturing industry also had
a direct input to government in the formulation stages of the Automobile
Agreement between October, 196^, and January, 1965. Their primary
21
contact in Ottawa was, again, C M . Drury, then Minister of Industry.
The parts manufacturers, unlike the "big four" manufacturers, were
unhappy with the proposed plan of October and are even more so seven
years after the Automobile Agreement was signed.
The parts manufacturers1 original complaint was that the proposed
Agreement provided almost no safeguards for their industry and instead
22
"seemed to be directed mainly at expanding motor vehicle production".

21

D.S. Wood, op.cit. (May Ik,

22

Ibid.

1965).

5k
The parts manufacturers appear to have been exactly right. They
insisted that Canadian content be fundamental in the plan and that
this content be maintained on a percentage basis similar to the sales
to production ratio provided for the automobile manufacturers. The
government did agree to require that "Canadian value-added" be fundamental to the final Agreement which it would sign with the United
States.

However, the parts manufacturers could not persuade the

government that the safeguards of the Canadian content should be
maintained on a percentage basis. Hather, this safeguard required
only that the Canadian content in motor vehicle production be "no less
than was contained in motor vehicle production in the model year 1964".
The parts manufacturers also managed to persuade the government that
aftermarket parts should be excluded from the Agreement.
The government was warned that the provisions mentioned above
would make it virtually impossible for smaller parts producers to
compete with their American counterparts while it would be difficult
even for the large Canadian manufacturer.

J.D. Loveridge and

H.A. Wilson, executives of the Ingersoll Tool Company which manufactures automotive parts, warned Mr. Drury in March, 196bi that in
order to survive, automotive parts manufacturers have to build up a
personal relationship with the automobile producers which would be
destroyed if Canadian content only were maintained.

Mr. Loveridge

told Mr. Drury that ultimately Canadian parts manufacturers would be
placed in the position of "dealing with complete and utter

D.S. Wood, op.cit., (May Ik,

1965).

55
2k
strangers",
who were headquartered in Detroit (in this particular
case) and who generally show a marked bias in favour of dealing with
suppliers in their own country with whom they are familiar.
Duplate Canada Limited, for example, found itself in exactly
this position as the Ford plant in Detroit, Michigan decided in
January 1972 that both the American Ford firm and its Windsor,
Ontario subsidiary would purchase the parts which Duplate Canada
Limited had previously supplied to the Windsor operation from firms
25
in the United states.

The result was that Duplate Canada Limited

of Windsor, Ontario, went out of business on January 28, 1972 and its
26
two hundred and ten employees lost their jobs.
Former Ford president, Karl Scott, claimed that the Canadian
content safeguard would provide Canadian parts suppliers with the
opportunity to compete "for orders to supply every Ford plant in
27
North America".

Mr. Scott's remarks notwithstanding, the govern-

ment, is well aware that even with the Canadian content safeguard,
the parts producers in this country are severely hampered by the
Automobile Agreement.

D.C. Thorn is fully aware that "Americans buy

2k
J.D. Loveridge, Memorandum to the Honourable C M . Drury
(March J, 1965). A copy of this memorandum was also sent to A.D. Hales
M.P., who used this information in his Remarks to the Progressive
Conservative Caucus Committee on Industry (Ottawa, March 26, 1965)•
Editorial comment, The Windsor Star, January 21, 1972.
26 T ,.,
Ibid.
7

K.E. Scott, Toronto Telegram, May 20, 1965.
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U.S. parts",

and this to such an extent that vehicle manufacturers

in the United States will try to supply all their own parts "in
house".

Mr, Thorn also pointed out that the vehicle manufacturers,

because of their original market power, can buy parts and keep
minimum inventories, while at the same time demanding and receiving
complete reliability of supply.
Arnold Wallace, who is Vice-President of Earl Robinson
Automotive Parts Limited of Oshawa, and who has been in the parts
manufacturing and supply business for twenty years, says that not
only have Canadian parts producers been hard pressed to compete with
their American rivals in the United states, but also that the market
29
in Canada for automotive parts is becoming smaller and smaller.
For example, from 1965 to 1968 the Canadian deficit in trade with
the United States in parts and accessories averaged $ 680 million
per year.

From 1961 to 196^ the average Canadian

deficit in trade

with the United States in parts and accessories averaged % ^+60 million
per year.

Both these factors Mr. Wallace attributes to the Automobile

Agreement in its present form which requires only a base level of
Canadian content.
Mr. Wallace explained that for the last two years the "big
four" car manufacturers have exceeded this basic level with the result
28
Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971.
29
Interview with A.J. Wallace, Vice-President of Earl Robinson
Automotive Parts Limited, August 12, 1971.
30
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., p. o?.
51

Ibid., p. 71.
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that they are "free to order virtually all of their additional
requirements in either country without incurring customs duties".
He added that the "big four" automobile assemblers can now satisfy
the Canadian content safeguard simply through their payrolls and
overhead costs. The net result, of course, is that Canadian vehicle
manufacturers will not have to buy any parts in Canada when their
parent firms can send these into Canada while meeting, in full, the
requirements of the Agreement.
Ford has now moved all its purchasing for engines and transmissions from Oakville, Ontario to Dearborn, Michigan.

There is

little chance, if the Duplate case is taken as an analogous example,
that a Canadian manufacturer will be able to supply engines or transmissions to Ford of Canada or to Ford of the United States, since the
personal relationship which the Canadian manufacturer utilizes is gone
and since, as Mr. Thorn pointed out, the Americans purchase domestically
33
whenever they can.

The American manufacturers tend to buy domestic-

ally for two reasons. First of all, the Americans truut and will
therefore buy a part they require which is made in the United States,
rather than a comparable part made elsewhere.

The second reason for

this habit, which is more tangible although not necessarily more
important than the reason just mentioned, is that in many cases the
firms producing these parts are subsidiaries of the automobile
manufacturers or have exclusive contracts to produce parts for the

Wallace Interview, August 12, 1971*
'Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971*

!
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automobile manufacturers.

D.S. «Vood of the Automotive Parts

manufacturers Association (Canada), noted in November, 1971 that
"our members have to sell all their parts - both for local or United
states consumption - to the United States headquarters of the Big
Four.

It's no good just beating the prices of United States

competitors by 1 or 2 percent." 35
The Canadian parts manufacturers

appear to be the only

organized group dissatisfied with the Automobile Agreement. They do
not for one moment say that the Agreement has not been lived up to
fully on both sides of the border.
simply does not give them a chance.

They do say that the Agreement
It was Mr. Wallace who put it

best when he said:
To compete with American parts producers, we must be prepared
to do so on their home grounds, since, unlike the vehicle
manufacturers, we do not receive a proportion of the annual
increment in the North American market. Further to get
contracts we must undercut U.S. prices by about 5 percent.
The Automobile Agreement has left our industry stranded.-^
It is impossible to ascertain whether it was lack of foresight or whether the parts manufacturers were sacrificed by the
Canadian government to obtain the Agreement in the first place,
which has left parts manufacturers in the position described above.
Officials both in the automobile industry and in the government
agreed that foresight might have been lacking as the Agreement

3^
Thorn Interview, August 3i 1971.
•^D.S. Wood, Toronto Globe and Mail, November 2k, 1971.
Wallace Interview, August 12, 1971.
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affects parts manufacturers and, interestingly enough, no one denied
that these same parts manufacturers were not originally sacrificed
either.

As I have mentioned above, the government has provided

Transitional Adjustment Benefits for the parts manufacturers but
these have been of little value in achieving the direct contact with
the automobile manufacturers which is necessary to the parts producers
to sell their products or in overcoming the tendency of American auto-,
mobile manufacturers to buy their parts in the United States, In any
event, a result of the Agreement is that a medium size plant, Ingersoll
Machine and Tool, has no work for 800 men.

37

A.D. Hales cited the Ingersoll case to the Conservative caucus
and to the House of Commons because he wanted to point out that there
were manufacturing concerns in Canada which were being adversely
effected by the Automobile Agreement, and because he knew that the

38
Minister responsible, Mr. Drury, was aware of this particular case.
Mr. Hales pointed out that he has always felt that the Agreement
represented a step toward the loss of Canada' political birthright;
but since it appeared to him that the automobile manufacturers in
Canada would benefit as a result of the Agreement, he decided to focus
his criticism of the Agreement on the distress of the parts manufacturer
and to place the political responsibility for their distress on the
37
A.D. Hales, Remarks to the Progressive Conservative Caucus
Committee on Industry (Ottawa, March 26, 1965). The Duplate Canada
Ltd. case is a more up to date example of the same problem. In this
instance, as cited above, 210 men lost their jobs in January, 1972.
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, March 19, 1965)1
p. 12571.
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Minister of industry, Mr. Drury.
The roie of the automobile workers union only became
apparent after the signing of the Agreement in 19&5. Not surprisingly
perhaps, the United Auto Workers had no input into the negotiations
in Ottawa beyond being informed that the government was attempting
to reach an agreement with the United States government to expand
the automobile industry in Canada.

The U.A.W. in Canada and the

United States supported the proposed Canada-United States negotiations
and has supported the Agreement since it came into effect up to the
present. The fact that the automobile union supports the pact is
^1
not difficult to understand.
Obviously, the union depends on the
manufacturer to require labour to produce automobiles and since the
Agreement was designed to allow automobile manufacturers in Canada
to be more efficient, the union saw itself as bound to benefit because
of this, in the long run. Although the union supports the Agreement,
the union interpretation of it has caused the Canadian government to
have some serious second thoughts about the secondary implications
of bilateral

trade arrangements entered into with the United States.

The former president of the U.A.W., Walterfieuther,presumably
caught the Canadian government off guard when in May, 1967, he demanded
59

Hales Interview, February 18, 1971.

ko
Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971.
"Report on Business", Toronto Globe and Mail, March 23, 1971.
k2
Thorn Interview, August 3i 1971.
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that the Canadian U.A.W. member

working in subsidiary automobile

plants in Canada, which had American parents, should be paid the
same wage as his United States counterpart.
Mr. Reuther's statement also indicates a change in the
structure of the international union. Just as the operation

of the

automobile manufacturers has become more integrated, so has the
structure of the international U.A.W. become more integrated since
the Automobile Agreement came into effect in 1965*

Implicit in

Mr. Reuther's statement is the assumption that the desires of the
Canadian and United States membership are coincident and more important
that these desires will be decided upon in the United States headquarters
of the union.
C M . Drury expressed both alarm and opposition to the U.A.W.
proposal which he felt could have the effect of forcing up all wafes
in Canada.

Drury agreed with the business community which argued that

only by paying lower wages, compared to those paid in the United States,
can a Canadian industry compete with an American counterpart.

It was

pointed out by the Canadian business community that the average
American factory worker earns about thirty percent more than a
Canadian doing the same job, but that on the other hand the Canadian
worker produces thirty percent lees per hour because the Canadian
industry serves a smaller market and gets less efficiency due to
short production runs.
It is not surprising that Mr. Reuther gave this Canadian

^Walter Reuther, The Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1967.
Ibid.
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argument short shrift since the Canadian government and automobile
manufacturing industry negotiated the Automobile Agreement to overcome this latter problem.

Indeed the government and the manufacturers

agreed in 19&5 and agree now that this very problem has been largely
overcome as will be pointed out below.

It is therefore, not any

more surprising that Mr. Drury only threatened to take retaliatory
measures against Mr. Reuther's demand for wage parity.

It is

difficult to see if the government could have taken action against
the U.A.W.'s rather logical position despite the economic implications
this had for other industries operating in Canada.
The actual union-manufacturers agreement of 1967 provided
for base wage parity, but the cost-of-living escalator clauses that
formed part of the agreement, which in large measure produced ato "out"
for the government, have subsequently produced an overall disparity
in wages. Leonard Woodcock pointed out that in the next round of
bargaining, which is due in 1973, the U.A.W. will push for complete
wage parity with the cost-of-living escalator based on the United
States cost-of-living index, ^ or a weighted composite index that
combines both United States and Canadian price changes. Obviously,
Mr. Woodcock sees the Automobile Agreement as having brought about
an integrated North American manufacturing industry which should pay
its workers uniform wages. He claims that overall wage parity can
only be achieved through the use of a common index so as "to avoid
continued strife and turmoil over wage disparities between the

Leonard Woodcock, Toronto Globe and Mail, April 23, 1971*
The 1967 cost-of-living escalator was based on the cost-of-living
index in each country.
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Canadian and U.S. auto industries".
To the government's great distress, wages in the automobile
industry are now related, though not yet identical, to United States
wages in the same industry rather than to the general wage level in
Canada as a result of the Automobile Agreement. The government
quarrels with the logic of the U.A.W., in part, because it does not
want this unique situation to be applied to other industries, such
as textiles, where there are branch plant manufacturers and international unions on the Canadian side of the border.

Also, the govern-

ment wants to avoid "importing" United States inflation by using
the United States cost-of-living index to determine Canadian wage
scales.
At the same time, the government recognizes the aspirations
of the Canadian members of the U.A.W.

D.C. Thorn said, "the issue of

wage parity is not a zero sum game and I am torn when I consider how
this particular issue can be handled".

Mr. Thorn explained that by "non

zero sum" he meant that he did not think that every time the
American automobile worker got a raise that his Canadian counterpart
would necessarily get an equivalent raise even though each man was
doing the same job. The government seems inclined to be dissatisfied
with the position taken by a union which supports the Automobile
Agreement as designed and implemented in the first instance by the
government itself.

^6
Leonard Woodcock, Toronto Globe and Mail, April 23, 1971<
k7
Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971.
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The Automobile Agreement has given the international automobile workers union increased leverage with which to put substantial
political pressure on the government.

The U.A.W. has become a more

integrated operation as a result of the Agreement and has bargained
for wage parity for Canadian automobile workers based on a cost-ofliving which is common to its Canadian and American workers. Indeed
collective bargaining was initiated on a continental basis in 1967

48

with the signing of the U.A.W.-Chrysler contract.

As a result of the integration of the U.A.W. which was
facilitated by the Agreement, and which has brought about the
increased dominance of the United States U.A.W. over the Canadian
U.A.W., the union has put political pressure on the Canadian government
in that the government is restrained from devising policies designed
to achieve Canadian political interests. The union objective of
Canada-United States wage parity denies the possibility of a
distinctly Canadian wage in the automobile industry in this country
which is based on the Canadian cost-of-living index. The United
States leadership has become more predominant over its Canadian
counterpart, as North American bargaining has developed as a result
of the Agreement.

North American bargaining detracts from the

Canadian identity which has been founded on east-west lines of
communication.

For example, the United States leaders of the U.A.W.

considered the request of its members at Ste. Therese, Quebec to

48
r
I.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 69.
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use French as a working language in the plant expendable in its
settlement with General Motors.^9

There is a further important

consequence of the Automobile Agreement for Canadian U.A.W. union
members.

The Automobile Agreement, which moves toward free trade

in automobiles in North America, gives added authority to the
American head of an American-based international union which has
more than 100,000 Canadian members. The Canadian automobile workers
naturally support an integrated U.A.W. to negotiate with a substantially integrated industry, but even this has its costs. The
Canadian union member has found that his American union leaders tend
to have only a peripheral interest in uniquely Canadian union demands.

50

Leonard Woodcock, who succeeded Walter Keuther, was rather
blunt about this latter point when he stated in April, 1971 that the
demand for wage parity in 1967 w a s made "on the grounds of equity
and also, frankly, to protect the jobs of our U.S. members".51 The
reaction of Canadian U.A.W. members to Mr. Woodcock's statement was
equally blunt. Larry Haiven, a Canadian U.A.W. member, said that

kq
7

Walter Reuther, The Wall Street Journal, June 2, 196?.
The U.A.W. membership at the Ste. Therese plant considered the use
of the French language in their plant to be an important issue, but
since their contract was negotiated by the United States leadership
of the U.A.W. this request did not receive the understanding nor sympathy
it might have if the Canadian branch of the U.A.W. had been negotiating.
independently with General Motors. The integration of the international
U.A.W., brought about by the Automobile Agreement, contributed directly
to the expendability of this uniquely Canadian request.
5

°Ibid.

51
Leonard Woodcock, Toronto Globe and Mail, April 25, 1971.
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Mr. Woodcock is obliged to favour the Agreement or "he'll be out of
a job and he knows it", and that "as long as Canadian auto workers
52
are in the W.h.N. they can expect to be sold out".

Speaking as

the chairman of a group called "Canadians to Abolish U.A.W. Autopact
Committee", Mr. Haiven indicated the need for an all-Canadian union
and stated that this could only be achieved by ending joint United
States-Canadian contract negotiations immediately and by demanding
that "the federal government give notice it will end its part in the
pact".5^
It is too early to tell how much of an impact Mr. Haiven's
group will have since their position goes contrary to the policy of
the United States leadership of their union and to the policy of the
Canadian government, both of which want to retain the Agreement,
although for very different reasons.

It is clear, however, that

some Canadian automobile workers are dissatisfied with their government which negotiated the Agreement and with the dominant position
that the American leadership of the U.A.W. has assumed as a result
of the integration brought about within the union by the Agreement.
The Canadian government is restrained from utilizing Canada's
human resources in the automobile industry in this country to their
full potential when, as a result of the Automobile Agreement, the
leadership of the integrated U.A.W. announces that it is primarily
interested in the jobs of its American membership.

Thus, the political

52
Larry Haiven, The Windsor Star, June 26, 1972.
55

Ibid.

pressure applied to the Canadian government by the automobile
workers union is substantial, but at the same time, such pressure
was invited and therefore probably inevitable, due to the integrative
effect which the Agreement has had on the automobile industry as a
whole, and indeed on the international U.A.W.

CHAPTER

III

NATIONAL POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF
THE AUTOMOBILE AGREEMENT
This chapter deals with the "National Political Assessments
of the Automobile Agreement".

The objective of this chapter will be

to examine the contrasting positions of the United States and Canadian
governments regarding the Agreement. The term United States "government" in this chapter refers to various American senators and some
executive officials of the Johnson and Nixon administrations.
Similarly the term "government" as it applies to Canada is used
to describe the Liberal governments of Prime Ministers Pearson and
Trudeau, as well as the public service, particularly the Departments
of Finance, and Industry, Trade and Commerce.
The American government has been opposed to the Automobile
Agreement since it has become apparent to them that the production
safeguards Canada wanted as part of the Agreement were to be of a
permanent, rather than a temporary nature. It now appears that the
United States government accepted the Automobile Agreement in 19&5
because that government felt that the Agreement would evolve into
a complete free trade agreement with Canada in the automobile
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1
industry sector.

The American objections have gathered strength

with the passage of time both in terms of the number of government
officials raising their voices against the Agreement and in terms
of the increasing frequency with which these objections have been
voiced,

it appears that the objections raised by these officials

in the Johnson and Nixon Administrations would have been successful
in radically changing, if not abrogating entirely, the Automobile
Agreement long ago except for the fact that these government
objections have not been supported by the automobile manufacturers
2
in the United States.
The reason the American manufacturers have not supported
their government is that the Agreement has significantly improved
the productivity of the industry in the American manufacturers'
subsidiary operations in Canada.

It is economically advantageous

for the United States-owned industry to increase Canada's share of
the automotive industry.

Even without the support of its domestic

automobile industry, the American government now objects to the
Automobile Agreement to such an extent that the Agreement is a major
item of trade disagreement in itself between Canada and the United
States, and a source of continuing strain in the overall relationship
between the two countries. As John Petty, Assistant Secretary of the

See, United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance,
Hearings on H.H. 90^2 (w<ashin{ ton, September l*f, 15, 16, 20 and 21,

1965).
2
As Mr. Hoy Bennett, President of Ford Canada, said "Oppositi
to the Agreement does not have its origin in the industry, on either
side of the border, the industry is very happy with the Agreement."
Roy Bennett, Toronto Globe and Mail, November 19. 1970.
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Treasury, told an International Monetary Fund meeting in September,
1971, the Automobile Agreement and more specifically the abolition
of the production safeguards in that Agreement is "a specific demand
on Washington's part".

Similarly, Peter Flanigan, a Special

Assistant to the President on International Economic Policy, said
that_the Nixon Administration wants "changes that work to the benefit
of the United States".
The American government's objections to the Automobile Agreement have to do, in part, with the American perception of the objective
of the Agreement.

The Americans have insisted since 1965» that the

purpose of the Agreement is to move both countries towards completely
free trade in automobiles and automotive parts. The most notable
advocate of this stance has been Senator Kussel B. Long of Louisiana,
who is now the chairman of the United States Senate Finance Committee.
Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana and former Senator Albert Gore of
Tennessee are also notable supporters of the proposition mentioned
above.

To my knowledge, no Congressman nor anyone in an executive

position in either the Johnson or Nixon administrations, including
these two Presidents themselves, has said that the objective of the
Automobile Agreement is not free trade between the two signatories.
Senator Russel Long outlined this position when, in September 1965»
he questioned Secretary of Commerce John Connor during the Senate

•5

-Vohn Petty, The Ottawa Citizen, September 29, 1971.
it

Peter Flanigan, The Windsor Star, November 13, 1972.
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Committee on Finance Hearings regarding the Automobile Agreement.
Senator Long asked Secretary Connor if the latter regarded the
Automobile Agreement, "as one of those classic situations where
free trade between two countries can benefit both countries", to
which Connor replied in the affirmative.

Secretary Connor noted

that the Agreement as it stood in 196^ did not represent absolute
free trade in the automobile industry, but that the Agreement was
an "orderly constructive move toward free trade, 1 think this was
the right move to make".

Secretary of the Treasury John Connolly

offered his support to this United States Administration proposal
for free trade in the automobile industry of North America when he
stated that the Canadian government ought "to permit private Canadian
V
citizens to import U.S. cars duty free."

I
The American povernment asserts that it accepted the Canadian }
sales-to-production ratio and va1n^-added "safeguards" in 196!? on the assumption that these features wer« temporary.

As Thomas Mann, former '•

Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, explained to the Senate
Committee on Finance, the United States administration agreed to the
safeguards because the American gutomotive industry "is much more
efficient than the Canadian industry"

and that safeguards were "designed

to help an infant industry in a transitional period until such time as

See United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance,
Hearings on H.R. 90^2 (Washington, September Ik, lb, 16, 20 and 21,
1965), P. 142.
Ibid., p. lkj>.
7
John Connolly, The New York Journal of Commerce, February 11,
1972.
See United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance,
Hearings on H.R. 90^2, p. 184.
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g
it is able to compete."

This assumption by the United States

government is not valid,

ihere is no statement in the Agreement that

the productior safeguards (which are included in the Agreement under
the headinp of Annex A) are to be of a temporary nature,

D.C. Thorn,

who was directly involved with the negotiations between the two
governments, told me that he felt that the Canadian negotiators were
far better prepared than their American counterparts when the Agreement was being drawn up.

In fact, Mr. Thorn went so far as to say

that "the Canadian delegation out-negotiated the American team".
Robert McNeill, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade Policy in
the Department of Commerce, indirectly confirmed Mr. Thorn's assessment
of the negotiations in his testimony to the Senate Committee on
Finance.

Mr. McNeill, who held an equivalent position to Mr. Thorn's

on the American negotiating team, told the Committee that the matter
of the Canadian production safeguards, which limit duty free importation of automobiles to qualifying Canadian manufacturers, only was
"discussed, but this particular point was not negotiated."
In light of these statements, it is my impression that the
Canadian government negotiators allowed the American officials to
believe that the production safeguards were a temporary feature of
the Agreement without having to commit this understanding to writing

Q

See United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance,

Hearings on H.R. 90^+2, p.

l&k.

Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971*
United States, Genate Committee on Finance, op.cit., p. l8j.

•'s part of the formal Agr»ement.

Further, the United states govern-

ment "iv; that •> + und^r^tood that the safeguards would be removed bv
f'-jpada "•- r-onn •> this country's automobile industry bprump geared
to North American production.

John Connolly, Secretary of the

T' "fifiur;/ "aid in "optember, 1971 that the United States Administration
understood that the safeguards were "of a transitory nature ^a'-'d that)
th3se ra^egunrds ou^ht now to be eliminated".

12

I The United States

government, specif"* rally the Departments of Commerce and Treasury,
insists that the Canadian safeguards are no longer necessary

in

view of the fart that the Canadian automobile industry had, within
one year afte^ the signing of the Agreement, been realigned for North
American product-ion and that the rapid p-rowth of the Canadian industry
during the life of the Agreement underlines this fact.

13

The United States government also argues that it signed the
"preement with a view to attaininp a completely open border, as far
as t^ade in automobiles is concerned, whereby the Canadian motorist
would be able tc buy cars on either side of the border without a
tariff being applied.

T^e Americans arcue that United States

Ik

citizens have been able to do "ju^t this since 196s.

Tt is a

unique situation when one can observe Senator ^arfke nrmiing that
the Canadian automobile consume1" should have the same n p h t to buy

12
John Connolly, Toronto Star, September 2?, 1971.
cf, John Connolly, I,a Presse, Septemb»r ?9, 1971.
13
United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance,

op.cit., 18^.

It.,
Ibid.
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his car where he pleases, as does his American counterpart.15
Senator Hartke'R political objections to the Agreement stem primarily
from two sources. First, because of the integrative character of the
Agreement several automotive parts manufacturers in hr. Hartke's home
state of Indiana no longer have direct access to the automobile
manufacturers which they supplied prior to the Agreement. Second,
Senator Hartke objects to the Agreement because it is not symetrical
in aoplication in Canada and the United states because of the Canadian
safeguards.
Many United States government officials are dissatisfied
that the Canadian government has to date been unwilling to remove
the production "safeguards" or to broaden the category of duty free
importers to include individuals as well as manufacturers. Secretary
of the Treasury, John Connolly expressed the Nixon adminstration's
dissatisfaction with the Agreement when he stated that he expected
that Canada would "at long last remove the production safeguards".17
Stated succinctly, a great many United States government officials
agree with Senator Hartke's assessment of the Agreement, namely that:
"what is being hailed as the most successful bilateral agreement in
Canadian history is conversely one of the worst for the United States.

15
.
"United
States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance,
op.cit., 173
16Ibid., p. 185.
17
John Connolly, Toronto Daily Star, September 27. 1971.
18
Vance H a r t k e , The Ottawa J o u r n a l , February 20, 1969.
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Former Secretary of Commerce John Connor confirmed Senator hartke's
assessment when he stated that United States production of automobiles
for North America

would decline "not in volume, but in percentages",19

ar, a result of the Agreement, John Petty, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, recently agreed with Senator Hartke's position when he
stated that changes in the Agreement would be "a symbol
a willingness co achieve balanced relations".

in demonstrating

The changes Mr. Petty

referred to were the removal of the production safeguards which the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury felt would not "have any material
21
effect on the automotive industry in either country".
Interestingly enough senator Hartke feels that the Automobile
Agreement is a bad arrangement for the united States because the private
Canadian consumer cannot import an automobile from the United States
duty free under the terms of the Agreement, while duty free treatment
is accorded the private American consumer who imports a new car from
22
Canada.

What Senator Hartke is arguing for is the removal of the

production safeguards which allow only Canadian automobile manufacturers
to import automobiles from the United States duty free, or in other
words, free trade between Canada and the United States in automobiles,
which he feels would allow the United States to establish a larger

19
United
op.cit., p.
176. States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance,
John Petty, The Windsor Star, October 1, 1971.
2L,.,
Ibid.
22
United States Congress, Senate Committee on Finance,
op.cit., p. 1&5«

trade «mrpius w~< th Canada in this commodity.
TP«»

American? vho qgree with Senator Hartke, such as John

Connolly «nd John Petty, noint out that Canada has been abJe to maintain its position on the Automobile Agreement since Canada has become
economically stronger, while the United States has become economica1ly
Aeaker in the trade relationship between *"he two countries and that thi?.
.-» dir^c* result of the Agreement.

Certain trade facts do not lend

tt,emselv°s to ttvs proposition, however.

Over the seven years that t.h°

Automobile Ap-reement has been ir> effect, Canada's cumulative deficit
in automobile trade, including parts, amounts to i> 1.9 billion.
Canada has h^d a surplus in auto trade with the United States for the
oast two years, but that surplus now appears to be dwindling.

In the

overall trade relationship between the two countries Canada hTS
traditionally had a deficit since outgoing payments to the United
States for interest and dividends outweigh ony trade surplus that
Canada might achieve.

The overall trade deficit with the United States

hap been smaller in the last two years, however, running at about
% 600 million.

There is little doubt that Canada's increase in

automobile trade with the United States over the past seven years has
reduced this deficit.

Perhaps the most important thing to note at

this time is not the figures mentioned above, which make a very good

"Market Report", Toronto Daily Star, May 6, 197?.
This report made use of statistics released by the Automotive Industry
Division of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce.
2

Ibid.
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case for Canada, but rather that the American government thinks that
the Automobile Agreement is doing a disservice to the overall trade
relationship between the countries. No amount of statistics seems
likely to sway the Americans from attempting to change what they
2.5

obviously think is a bad trade arrangement for them.

The United States government favours a free trade arrangement
with Canada in the automobile industry because it would increase the
surplus in automotive trade which the United States presently has
with Canada, but which has been declining since the Automobile Agreement came into effect. Free trade in automobiles would undoubtedly
bring about complete integration of the Canadian and American automotive industries if their present status is taken as an indicator.
It has already been pointed out that partial integration in the
automobile industry, brought about by the Agreement has political
disadvantages for Canada, since the locus of decision-making for the
npsrati mwvf_ the inrlnci-ry-4-n—Canada is now more solidly entrenched
outside Canada.

North American production runs, the subordination of

Canadian managers to managers of the parent operation in the United
States, and the demand by an international union that its Canadian
membership be paid according to a non-Canadian cost-of-living index
all restrict the Canadian government from initiating economic policies
which are designed to achieve Canadian political objectives such as

25
The American position is that the Agreement has brought
about the reduction of the United States surplus in trade with Canada
in automobiles and parts to & 600 million in 1970, and 1971. The
American position ignores the # 1.9 billion surplus accumulated by
the United States in automobiles and parts during the life of the
Agreement. See Canada, Statistics Canada, Canada's Foreign Trade
in Motor Vehicles and Parts (Ottawa, February, 1972).
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east-west ties of commerce, the development of Canadian managers
at an international business level, and distinctive wage policies
based on the Canadian cost-of-living.

Given these results of a

partial free trade arrangement, one could expect that free trade in
the automobile industry would lead, in all likelihood, to the removal
of all decision-making regarding automobile production in this country
from Canada with the result that the Canadian government would have

.

no direct political control over the operation of the automobile
industry in Canada.

Further, given the situation which has developed

in Canada during the life of the Agreement, the evidence suggests that
a bilaterial free-trade arrangement in automobiles and parts would
bring about a substantial reduction in the manufacture of these
commodities in Canada.

Indeed, it is within the realm of possibility

that the only manufacture of automobiles and parts that would take
place in Canada under the terras of a free trade agreement would be
that which could not be met by factories in the United States. The
Canadian automobile industry would then be reduced to a distribution
agency instead of continuing as a manufacturing concern.
i

The American government believes that the Automobile Agreement
has directly contributed to its balance-of-payment difficulties with

i
I

;

the result that the American government threw down the trade "gauntlet",!
in the form of a ten percent import surcharge on August 1^, 1971.
The ten percent surcharge did not directly affect the Automobile Agreement, or other joint trade arrangements between the two countries,
but it did bring such extensive pressure to bear on all other commodities
that Canada exports to the United States, that it appeared by the end
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of November, 1971 as if Canada was about to agree to changes in the
Agreement.

Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs,

announced on November 26, 1971, that Canada and the United States
would "reach agreement reasonably soon on contentious points in the
196^ pact,"

The contentious points Mr. Sharp referred to are the

sales-to-production ratio, and the value-added safeguards. Secretary
of the Treasury John Connolly left no doubt that the United States
administration wanted Canada to drop the production safeguards when
he stated in December, 1971, that "progress on existing trade
27
relations with Canada will be made".
The Americans removed the ten
percent surcharge on December 18, 1971, but the pressure against the
Automobile Agreement was maintained through the formation of the
Domestic International Sales Corporation in December 1971. Through

'

the "DISC" program the American government allows United States-based
companies to postpone payment of tax on up to one-half of their
export earnings.

In effect, "DISC" encourages multi-national enter-

prizes, such as the automobile manufacturers in Canada, to move more
of their operations to the United States and export to other countries..
It seems likely that some, if not all, of the parent United States
firms of the subsidiary automobile manufacturers in Canada will use
"DISC" with the result that the Americans own balance-of-payments
problems may, in large measure, be overcome despite the provisions
of the Automobile Agreement.

In April, 1972, it became apparent that

"DISC" was going to have exactly this effect on the automobile

Mitchell Sharp, Toronto Globe and Mail, November J>0, 1971.
27
John Connolly, Toronto Globe and M a i l , December 20, 1971.
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industry in Canada despite the provisions of the Automobile Agreement.
Kdward Broadbent, the New Democratic Party Member of Parliament
for the automobile producing constituency of Oshawa-tfhitby, asked the
Minister of industry, Trade, and Commerce, Jean-Luc Pepin, if he was
aware that the Ford and Chrysler companies in the United States were
28
using the "DISC" program.
Mr. Pepin replied that he had no information to this effect despite the careful documentation that Mr. Broadbent
29
provided with his questions.
As a result of subsequent questions
from Mr. Broadbent, the Minister revealed to the house of Commons that
Ford and Chrysler were indeed using the "DISC" program in the United
States.

Outside the House of Commons Mr. Pepin agreed with

Mr. Broadbent that the use of "DISC" by these two companies was a
violation of the Agreement.

In effect, the Minister of Industry,

Trade and Commerce has admitted that the American government can alter
its balance-of-payments position to its favour even in the automobile
industry, despite the Automobile Agreement.
The political significance of this revelation is that notwithstanding trade statistics, which do not support their case, and the
reasonableness and diplomacy of Mitchell Sharp and Jean-Luc Pepin,

Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April 15, 1972,),
p. 129329
*Ibid.
Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April Zt,
p . 17Jb
31
.,
Jean-Luc Pepin, The Ottawa Journal, April do, 1972.

1972),

the American government is determined to change the Automobile
Agreement to its greater advantage through political pressure, in the
form of the "DISC" plan, if it is unable to alter the wording or
sections of the Agreement itself.

In a larger political context, the

Automobile Agreement is instructive to the Canadian government in
that through th"i s <>xperience it should realize that what the United
,'fq+oc; p-overnment cannot get in writing in bilateral arrangements
it w i n

force through the poiiticai pressure at its disposal.
The C~. .^ian government is more than satisfied that the Auto-

mobile Agreement has been a tremendous boon for this country.

Indeed

among the povprni<>nt officials I contacted there is unanimous agreement wath f^nator Hartke's assessment that the Automobile Pact is,
in terms of Canadian advantage, the "most successful bilateral
32

!

agreement in Canadian history".
From the beginning the Canadian government saw the Automobile
Agreement not as a free trade arrangement between Canada and the United
States, but rather as a means whereby Canadian production of automobiles would grow as the North American demand for automobiles
(,vnanded.

In th"5 s regard, my informants in the public service ap-ree

that the Automobile Agreement has more than achieved what had been
hoped for in ]9bf?. As Mr. Thorn put it: "the Agreement has worked
3^
out better than expected";
Mr. Barr, who is responsible for the day
to day operation of the Automobile Agreement, concurred that the*

32
Vance H a r t k e , Toronto Daily .Star, May 6 , 1972,
'Thorn I n t e r v i e w , <\'irust 3» 19*71.

'
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Agreement has benefited Canada "more than was expected".

Mr. Thorn

war, anxious to point out that the Agreement continues to be a success
because thf» r.-i! es-to-production ratio guarantees that Canada will have
an increasing share of the automobile market in North America.

Thus,

*he Canadian government is fully aware that this safeguard is the
basis for the success of the Agreement in Canada, and at the same
time it realizes that the American government as prepared to sacrifice
the Agreement "in toto" if Canada does not rescind th** safeguards
rrentioned above, as well as the value-added provision which has
already been described.
Mr. Bar*- provided further evidence that Canada is not
i

prepared to engage in free trade in automobiles with the United

,

States.

j

He s^id that it was inconceivable that a trade paot in

I
automobiLes could exist between Canada and the United States "if j
35 i
expanding production in Canada was not guaranteed in the pact".
;
Mr. Thorn indicated that Canada was able to include the safeguards
in the Agreement because the Canadians simply out-negotiated the
Americans between October, 1964 and January, 1965.

This hardly

complements the American government's assertion (see above) that it
was understood, at least on their part, that the Canadian safeguards
were to be of temporary duration.

My own assessment is that it is

invariably the party that wants to change an agreement which claims
that mutually agreed upon undertakings were repudiated subsequently

34
Barr Interview, August 3» 1971«
55

lbid.

8$
by the other party.
Despite the fact that there is no mention in the formaL
Agreement that the Canadian safeguards were to be of a temporary
nature, the p-overnment of the United States has informed the Canadian
Fovernment that the United States signed the Agreement on the understanding that the Canadian safeguards would eventually be dropped.
The American position is weak in terms of what Canada and the United
States contracted for in the formal reading of the Agreement.
However, because of the extensive economic ties between Canada and
the United States and because of the relatively stronger United
States position in the relationship, the American government is able
to impress upon Canada that in politically-nepotiated bilateral trade
arrangements puch as the Automobile Agreement, the expectations of
the United States are as important as the formal signing of the
Agreement.
Canada is in no position to ignore the American expectations
of the Automobile Agreement and is therefore faced with having to
make a political decision from among three alternatives.

Canada can

change the Agreement to a free trade arrangement through the removal
of the production safeguards; Canada can abrogate the Agreement,
giving the United States a year's notice of the Canadian intention
to do so; or Canada can resist the indirect pressure by the American
government and maintain the Agreement in its present form.

The

Canadian government is most interested in an Automobile Agreement

cf. Mitchell bharp, Toronto Globe and Mail, November 30,
1971 and John Connolly, Toronto Globe and Mail, December 20, 1971.
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which guarantees production in Canada and least interested in free
trade in automobiles with the United States.
further, Mr. Thorn pointed out that the Automobile Agreement
had not established a precedent in Canada-United States trade
relations but, rather, continued a trend which had begun with the
establishment of the Defence Production ^harinp Agreement of I9'?fe.
Indeed, Mr, Thorn went on to say that not only did he feel that the
Automobile Agreement was the continuation of a trend in the right
direction but, also that he favoured "further integration of CanadaUnited States trade arrangements".

Again Mr. Barr agreed, saying

that without question the Agreement "represented a step forward
since both automobile production and jobs in that industry have
increased, both as a direct result of the Agreement."
Canadian deficit

The

in the value of automotive parts has increased

from & 576 million in 1964 to % 1 billion in 1968. The deficit has
not been steady but does underline the complaints of the parta

' Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971.
38
Barr Interview, August $, 1971. Mr. Barr is correct in his
assessment that the Automobile Agreement has brought about an absolute
increase in automobile production and in automotive industry jobs.
In each case, however it should be noteu that a trade-off is involved
which has allowed these increases to take place in Canada. Production
of motor vehicles (i.e. automobiles and commercial vehicles) has
increased in Canada from 671,018 units in 1964 to 1,19.5,572 units in
1970, (see Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics: 42-001, Production
of Motor Vehicles (Ottawa, July 19?1)). The increase is a dramatic
one. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the decline
in production of motor vehicle parts and accessories has been equally
dramatic. The total amount of money spent on capital construction,
which can be used as a measure of the expansion of the parts industry
in Canada, has declined from $ 15,8 million in 1964 to % 9.^ million
in 1971, (see Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics: 61-205, Capital
and Repair Expenditures (Ottawa, May 1971)).

manufacturers mentioned above and emphasizes the situation which Has
occurred as a result of the manufacturers' ability to meet the
Canadian "vaiu^-added" requirement of the Agreement, namely, that
the growth of the parts industry in Canada is now curtailed.
.Similarly, the United States trade balance in automotive parts
with Canada has increased by $ 385.2 million between 1964 and 1968.
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This represents a percentage increase of 55 percent over and above
the trade surplus in automotive parts held by the United States prior
to 1965. The pressure on the parts industry can be measured in
another way.

While the value of automotive parts exports from Canada

40
has increased from » 73 million jn 1964 to )t 749 million in 1968,
the value of automotive parts imports to Canada has increased from
4l
% 6^+9 million in 1964 to % 1.8 billion in 1968.
Similarly, there has been a definite increase in the number
of Canadians employed in the automobile industry since the Automobile
• * being.
u • 42
Agreement came into

39
C.E. Heigie, op.cit., p. 87.
40
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics: 65-004 and 65-007,
Value of Automotive Parts Trade (Ottawa, June, 1969).
Ibid.
42
In 1964 the entire automobile industry, including the parts
industry which experienced a decline in employment, employed 69,008
Canadians, while in 1970 there were 82,024 people employed by the
industry. The Agreement has therefore brought about an increase of
13,016 jobs in Canada. This is hardly a "phenomenal" increase over
the course of six years. These statistics were obtained through
a telephone conversation with W.J. Patrick, Officer, Motor Vehicle
Division, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, Ottawa,
February 11, 1972.
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As a result of the economic advances made by the automobile
industry in Canada since 196^ potential political opposition has
been blunted for the most part.

Drawing a parallel with the

Reciprocity issue early in this century. Conservative critic
A.D. Hales denounced the Agreement as

a"return to lyil"

when it

was announced, but in light of the economic benefits which most
pundits predicted for the Agreement (see the press reports in
Chapter II) Mr. Hales' arguments failed to sway many Canadians.
As a result, Mr, tiales and the Conservative party have changed
their tactics.

Mr. "ales and his Conservative colleague, Harold

Danforth, who represents the Ontario automobile producing constituency
of Kent-Essex, now assail the Agreement because of the harm it has
done to some Canadian automotive parts manufacturers.

This tactic

has not touched a responsive chord in the Canadian electorate either.
In fact, during the series of trade negotiations between Canada and
the United states in the past five years, the Conservative party has
not suggested that the Automobile Agreement is a major irritant,
presumably because the Conservatives are interested in perpetuating
the advantages occurring to manufacturers through the Agreement, but
rather that, the Liberal government hap been inept in handling these
negotiations.
The position of the New Democratic Party has also changed

A.D. Hales, Hamilton Spectator, May 8, 196b,
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, M*y 4, 196"?),
pp. 892-893.
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, December 15,
1971), p. 1048^.
'

*7
siT-e 196^. Former M.P. Reid Scott's anxiety over the plight of
dislocated automobile workers was logical enough,

in that the New

Democratic Party claims to speak for labour, but largely overcome
by the government through the introduction of" the Transitional
Adjustment Benefit program in September, 1%^.

The present New

Democratic Party critic of the Agreement is Kdward Broadbent who
represents the constituency of Oshawa-Whi+by, the major industry o f
which is automobile production.

Mr. Broadbent does not attack the

Agreement as a whole since this course would potentially have disastrous
political effects for Mr. Broadbent personally as the Agreement has
maintained and slightly increased the employment of his constituents.
Mr. Broadbent's prospects of re-election would not be enhanced by
criticizing even indirectly, the main employer of his constituents.
The present position of the New Democratic Party, as articulated by
Mr. Broadbent, is that the Droduction safeguards contained in the
Agreement are not stringent enough.

Specifically Mr. Broadbent

arpues that value-added percentage of Canadian equipment used in new
cars should be 100 percent.

This tactic has similarly elicited

little response either from the government or from the public.
Mr. Broadbent's revelation that the parent companies of Ford and
Chrysler in the United States are using the "DISC" program caused
some embarrassment for the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce,

Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, June 28, 1965),
p. 2911.
k7
Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April 13, 3972),
p . 1715.
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Jean-l.uc Pepin, hut the concern of both men was essentially the same,
namely:

that the "DISC" program when used by American automobile

48

manufacturers is a violation of the Automobile Agreement.

The political opposition has been unable to mount an effective
campaign of criticism against the Agreement largely because such
arguments concern Canada's long term political interests and the
need for the development of an industrial strategy in this country.
When these arguments are compared to the immediate and potentially
short-lived benefits, which the Agreement has brought to Canadian
automobile manufacturers, it is perhaps not surprising that the
Agreement is not and has no prospect of becoming a political issue in
itself while it is in effect. The Agreement is only likely to become
an issue in itself if the Canadian government were to meet the United
States demand for the removal of the production safeguards. The
political opposition seems not to have considered the implications
of the integration which has taken place since 196^. One consideration j
!
involves the relationship of Canadian jobs in the industry in Canada
'
t

I

to the vehicles these workers produce for the North American market.
To use an example which has previously been cited,

if Ford were

to experience P decreased demand for its Maverick, the company could
of course, be expected to cut back production on that model line.
Ford's subsidiary operation in Canada manufactures the Maverick and
if cutbacks were required, it would not be surprising- to see Ford of

48
p. 1715.

Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, A p r i l 2 8 , 1972),
^9
Shelley Interview, July b, 1971.

{

^9
Canada's parent firm in the United States order a shutdown in Canada
before throwing any of its workers involved in production of the
Maverick in the United States out of work.
Thus the Automobile Agreement has brought about an increase
in the number of jobs available to Canadians in the automobile
industry, although that increase his not been spectacular.

At the

same time the Agreement has subjected these jobs, through increased
production integration, to the marketing decisions of a parent
company which is likely to consider its Canadian employees as a
secondary consideration if it does not consider them as simply being
expendable.

The Massey-Ferguson layoff of February, 1971, provides

an example of what may be a continuing trend.

At that time, the decision

to cut back on production in North America by the United States head
office led to the layoff of _5!?0 American workers at the MasseyFerguson parent plant and the layoff of 1,200 workers at the Canadian
50
subsidiary plant.
The Massey-Ferguson experience is in .some ways analogous and
therefore instructive about the situation which exists in the
automobile industry as a result of the Agreement.

The farm machinery

industry in Canada operates under North American free trade, whereas
the automobile industry does meet production requirements.

In both

cases, however, production is set up accordinp- to North American
/ demand due to the integration which has developed in each industry.
f
In the automobile industry, it is possible that Canadian workers

"Massey-Ferguson Announces Layoff", l'oronto_Daxly Star,
February 10, 1971.
~""
~
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rould benefit if North American demand increases for the models
they are producing.

The point is that in both industries the jobs

of Canadian workers are related to North American demand, rather
than Canadian demand and that when North American demand declines ,
in an integrated industry, Canadian workers will likely suffer job,'
/
losses out of proportion to their American counterparts.

Therefore,

the relation of Canadian empJoyment to North American demand, which
results from these Canada-United states trade agreements does not
serve the Canadian political interest of developing east-west
commercial ti«*s nor the maximum utilization of Canadian human
resources when these resources tend to be more responsive to demana
for their need, which exists primarily outside of Canada.
The Canadian government, both before and after the Automobile
Agreement came into effect, has kept a close watch on the price gap
between cars sold in the United States and cars sold in Canada.
The price that a Canadian has paid for his car has always been higher
than that paid by his American counterpart.

Since the inception of

the Agreement the Canadian government has hoped, and in some cases
predicted, that this gap would be narrowed if not entirely eleminated
as a result of the market advantages which the Agreement would facilitate,
i» 13b)

in 1970 Canadians paid from 3 to j>.5 percent more (or about
L>1
for a similar car model than did Americans.
This represents

the smallest disparity which has been achieved during the seven year
life of the Agreement.

In 1966 for example, the Canadian consumer

paid 5 percent more for the same model of car than did the American

rt.J. Patrick, op.cit., (Ottawa, February 11, 1972).
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consumer,
Canadian government officials have cited various reasons for
the difference in prices.

D.C. Thorn explained that the national

sales tax Ln Canada of h percent (the rate was [?. percent four years
ago) was one of the reasons that a price difference exists between
Canada and the United states, as well as the fact that replacement
parts are more expensive in this country.

Kepiacement parts are

not included under the terms of the Agreement as 1 have pointed out
above, so the Canadian Automotive
market in C"iada.

Parts industry supplier * hi ^

Since the potential market is sma ' I T in Canada

thin the United States, n Canadian automotive partr ^rripany is unable
to achieve the longer Rnd therefore more economical production runs
that its American counterpart can achieve.

Therefor^, the more

expensive production costs in Canada result in highe*- vrA "es *"or
parts kept in stock by automobile manufacturers and others which are
uijed as other than original equipment.

Since the automobi Le manu-

facturer must maintain a stock of replacement parts, the increased
"osts of these parts in Canada is passed on to the new car consumer.
Mr. Barr agreed that the Canadian national sales tax is a
contributing factor to the price difference, but he added that
distribution in Canada is more expensive than in the United States
and thereby also contributes to the price gap.

53

^oth men agreed

that the "pegged" Canadian do]Lar, which had been set at 92.5 cents

5?
Thorn Interview, August 3, 1971*
53
Barr Interview, August 3, 1971.
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American was also a contributing factor to the price difference.

The

Caridi?n dollar has been Hoatinp freely since June 1, 1970, and
during the first quarter of 1972 was valued at % 1.01 and % 1.02 in
United states funds.

Theoretically, the pri-e of an automobile

comi O F into Canada under the terms of the Ap-reement should cost less
to the Ganad-inn consumer if the Canadian dollar is worth one to
two cents more than the United States dollar.

The evidence suggests

that in spite of the Agreement it is stili more expensive to produce
a car in Canada as compared to the United States, even though the
government of Canada has consistently claimed that it negotiated the
Agreement to overcome this very discrepency.
Tn 197i, the Automobile Apreement and explanations of government officials nothwithstandinp, the averape price difference rose to
over 8 percent, and the Canadian government is clearly concerned.
John Turner, Minister of Finance, announced on April 26, 1972, that
he would ask the major car manufacturers in Canada to be more specific
in the economic reasons which have been piven for this increase.
James Dykes, who speaks f or the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
replied that hipher Canadian automobile prices in 1971 were due to
increased production costs in this country and to the fluctuation of

bb

the Canadian dollar.

In view of the government's assessment of the

effect of the price differential of the "pepped" Canadian dollar,
Mr. Dykes' latter argument

would seem to be suspect.

Mr. Turner's

Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April 26, 1972),
p. 16^6.

bb
" J a m e s Dykes,__Toronto DaiJ.y_ S t a r , April 2 6 , 1972.

announcement that he would seek an explanation for the rise in tfhe
price differential for cars indicates that the government is not
satisfied with explanations offered by the automobile industry or by
the government itself. The government seems to feel that it has taken
the steps, such as the reduction of the national sales tax and the
floating of the dollar, required to reduce the price difference between
cars purchased in Canada and the United States and it seems to want to
know why a result opposite to what it has expected has occurred.
The government apparently sees the Agreement as a means of
narrowing the price gap between similar models of cars in Canada
and the United States, but not as the instrument to eliminate this
gap.

The automobile industry claims that even with the Agreement,

automobile production is more expensive in Canada than in the United
States, so that higher prices must be charged in this country to
compensate for the difference in production costs. The government
recognizes the original market power of the automobile industry and
so has claimed that the Automobile Agreement has been worthwhile in
that until 1971 the price gap had been steadily narrowed.

The price

gap in 1971 was at the same level as it was in 196^ when there was no
Automobile Agreement. The government will call for the car manufacturers to explain but neither the government nor the Agreement is '
likely to effect a roll back in the price of cars in Canada. The
automobile industry sets the price for the production and the sale
of its products and the government is prepared to let the industry
continue to do so even if it means not talking about this particular
aspect of the "most successful bilateral agreement in Canadian history".

9k
The evidence of the government's pouture in this regard is
two-fold.

First of all, Mr. Turner has said only that he will ask

the automobile manufacturers to explain the widening pric* difference.
He has Riven no indication that the government is contemplating
requesting the automobile manufacturers in Canada to roll back
their prices.

Second, the budget which the government presented

to the House of Commons on May fe, 197^ provided incentives for the
expansion of all industry in Canada including the automobile
industry.

Mr. Turner's approach appears to encourage the pricing

policy of the automobile industry, rather than hoLding the industry
accountable for its prices in Canada.

Mr. Turner's budget is, in

part, a political attempt by the Liberal povernment to counter th*>
"DISC" program of the United states which has affected the automobile
industry in Canada despite the existence of the Agreement.

l f seems

apparent that the United States brought the "DISC" program into
being to rectify balance-of-trade problems such as those that the
united States government was experiencing with Canada under the
terms of the Automobile Agreement.
further below.

This aspect will be discussed

At the same time the budget encourages integration

within the automobile industry which was initiated by the Automobile
Agreement.

The government has invited,

implicitly, a pricing policy

in the automobile industry which is set on a North Ameriran basis.
A North American pricing scheme which is established outside Canada,

" See, for instance, statements made by Secretary of the
Treasury John Connolly, Toronto Globe and Mail, December 20, 1971.

but which is anplied to this country, undermines the Canadian
government's capacity to implement independent tax and monetary
policies which is a phenomenum counter to Canada's long term
political interest.
The most immediate concern of the government with regard to
the Automobile Agreement is the way in

which the United States

"DISC" program can circumvent the Agreement, entirely.
p

Jean-Luc

fpin, the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce has stated
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that "DJ5>C" breaks the Canadian-United State*- lutomobile Agreement.
Chrysler and ford informed Mr. Pepin on
April twenty-eighth,

April twenty-seventh and

respectively, that their parent companies in

b8
the United States have been using "DISC" since December 1971.
Through the use of "DISC" the United States automobile manufacturers
can circumvent the Automobile Agreement in two ways.

First, the

American companies can use the tax benefit to reduce their prices
in Canadian markets. Second, "DISC" can lure production by United
States subsidiaries in Canada back to the United States and at the
same time damage Canadian sales in third countries, where American
automobile manufacturers have the benefit of "DISC".

Father of

these courses undertaken by Chrysler and Ford, or both of them,
would without doubt, cause a substantial surnlus in trade m automobiles in favour of the United States which would be unaffected by
the Automobile Agreement.

The options open to the Canadian government

57
Jean-Luc Pepin, The Ottawa Journal, A.pril 29, 1972.
eg
C a n a d a , House of Commons, D e b a t e s ( O t t a w a , A p r i l 2 8 ,
1 9 7 2 ) , p . 171 s ?.
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are limited until the true effect of the "DISC" prop-ram can be
measured on the automobile industry in Canada.
The Canadian government can invoke countervailing duties
if it proves that the reduced prices available to American manufacturers
in Canadian markets seriously damages local Canadian industry.

It

is also posbible for Canadian customs officials to block, on thp
instructions of the government, the entry into Canada of automobile
manufacture^ which have benefited under "DISC". This latter course
is virtually -impossible in a logistic sense so that, in fact, it is
more a theoretical option than a real one. This is so because a
Canadian customs official at a Canadian port of entry has to make a
decision on the spot as to whether or not specific manufactures coming
into Canada fall under the overall terms of the Automobile Agreement.
The problem here then is not having the time to examine the great
volume of automobile manufactures coming into the country with a view
of ensuring that the terms of the Agreement are not being broken.
A more important reason explaining why it is so difficult
to prevent automobile manufactures from coming into Canada after
having been subsidized in the United States by "DiiiC" is that the
United btates government has so far refused to provide Canada with a
list of American companies sending automobile manufactures into Canada
using the "DliiC" program.

The Department of Industry,Trade and

Commerce has only been able to ascertain that Ford and Chrysler are
using "DloC" by requesting this information from the subsidiaries of

Jean-Luc Pepin, The Ottawa Journal, April 29, 197^*
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these two corporations in Canada.

It is difficult indeed for a

customs official to identify first of all which companies in the
United otates are using "DliiC" to send specific automobile manufactures into Canada and second, to designate which imports of
the huge volume coming into Canada fall outside the terms of the
Agreement and are therefore subject to duty.

It is also unlikely

that Canada would apply countervailing duties on automotive products
since this step wouLd likewise be tantamount to breaking the
Agreement.
The "Dl^C" program, as it applies to the automobile industry
is the United btates government's attempt to ensure that the United
.States will regain and hold its surplus in automobile trade with
Canada without directly altering the Automobile Agreement. The
Canadian government responded to "DISC" with the budget proposals
of May 8, 1972. The government has offered substantial tax concessions to all manufacturers in Canada, including automobile manufacturers,
and automotive parts manufacturers, who invest in new capital equipment
which will expand production and increase efficiency.

The Canadian

government has met the American government's attempt to circumvent the
Agreement with incentives that do the same type of thing as the "DIbC"
program was designed to do, for the tax concessions to manufacturers
announced in the budget on May tt, also effectively circumvent the
Automobile Agreement itself.

Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April 28, 1972),
p. 1715Canada, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, May 6, 1972),
p. 2001.
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The political repercussions resulting from this move and
counter move, namely the United states government's "DISC" prop-ram
and the Canadian government's May 8, 1972 budget proposals, have
been minor.

The Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce may have

suffered some embarrassment in that an opposition Member of
Parliament (Edward Hroadbent) brought forth information to the public
which Mr. Pepin did not seem to have, namely, that two American
automobile manufacturers were using the "Drsc" program.

The opposition

did rot call for the *-esigmtion of Mr. Pepin and neither the government no1" the opposition "ailed for the abrogation of the Automobile
Agreement by r anada.

Tndeed the government and the opposition seem

determined to retain the economic benefits brought about by the
Agreement without giving outward consideration to the affect the
Automobile Agreement har on Canada's long term political interest
and nn the development of long range industrial strategy.
It might appear from the discussion in the preceding chapter
that the Canadian and American governments have reached an impasse,
or at least, have been unable to alter the Automobile Agreement via
normal negotiations.

The Automobile Agreement, similar to most

facets of the relationship which exists between Canada and the United
States, is nothing if not dynamic.
The United States government is determined that the Agreement
should evolve into a free trade arrangement in automobiles and parts
with Canada ard is prepared to apply substantial political pressure,
in the form of the "DISC" program, to bring about this desire.

The

Canadian government is satisfied with the Agreement and determined
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to resist American pressure an evidenced by the May 8, 1972 budget
response to the United .Staters "DISC" program.

For the time being,

the Agreement itself remains intact and has important political
consequences for Canada,

The following chapter deals with the

politi-al consequences that the Automobile Agreement has for Canada.

CHAPTER

IV

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
AUTOMOBILE AGREEMENT

The goal of this chapter is to review the political issues
and implications associated with the Agreement.

These include the

passage of the Agreement by an order-in-council, the difficulty
the Liberal government has had in explaining the reasons why the
Agreement has not brought about parity in the prices that Canadian
and American retail consumers pay for their automobiles, and the
political effects of the continental rationalization of the
automobile industry as encouraged by the Agreement.
The chapter also deals with more recent political implications
of the Agreement such as the United States import surcharge provisions
and "DISC" program and the subsequent Canadian responses to these
measures. Further, the chapter will survey the political issues of
wage parity in the automobile industry and the more nationalistic
outlook of the Canadian branch of the United Auto Workers both of
which have arisen as a result of the Agreement. This section also
considers the nature of the political opposition to potential changes
in the Agreement in the House of Commons, a summation of the author's
views on the future of the Agreement itself and the instruction which
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the Agreement provides for the future of Canada and Canadians.
The Canadian government has been criticized by the Progressive
Conservative Opposition for bringing the Automobile Agreement into
effect in 19^lb by order-in-council rather than allowing a full debate
in Parliament. This issue is a moot point. A full debate of the
Automobile Agreement before Parliament, in my opinion, would have
only delayed the Agreement from becoming law as soon as it did. In
196^ the Canadian government felt that the automobile industry was
not contributing its potential to the Canadian economy as a whole,
despite the fact that the industry constituted then, as it does now,
one of the most important single sectors of the economy.

The govern-

ment designed the Automobile Agreement to allow the industry to
increase its output, improve its export performance, and provide
i more jobs for Canadians. Trade arrangements of this type between
Canada and the United States have always prompted Canadian critics
to point out, often with justification, that the Canadian government
has arranged another "sell out", such as in the case of the Columbia
fiiver Treaty and in some of the energy resources trade arrangements.
It has been pointed out, in an unconvincing way, that an
2
order-in-council is "a standard parliamentary procedure".

A minority

cf. The testimony of General A.G.L. McNaughton before,
Canada House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and
National Defence (Ottawa, 196^).
Thorn Interview, August 3i 1971«
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government with memories of the Pipeline I>.:h.i<-p still fresh in its
mind would have been unwise politically to risk a full scale debate
in Parliament even over an agreement as important as the automobile
3
trade pact."

Furthermore, a full debate may have forced the govern-

ment to reveal not only to the opnosition but also to the United
States administration that the sales-to-prndur^ion and value-added
safeguards were to be a permanent feature of the Automobile Agreement.

Such a revelation would have probably killed the ratification

of the Agreement by the United states Congress, since as has been
pointed out, most United States politicians regard the Automobile
Agreement as the first step toward free trade in the automobile
industry between Canada and the United States.

If the Conpress had

felt in 19bb that the production safeguards were to be a permanent
feature of the Agreement, it would have undoubtedly not passed the
k
Agreement into law.
The critics in Canada were most severe as it
was; but it is unlikely that the continuation or even the abrogation
of the Automobile Agreement tomorrow would br-ing about a general
election, much less the defeat of the government.
however, both of these possibilities were distinct.

Tn .Januarv, 1965,
Therefore, an

order-in-coun^il was the only expedient that the Liberal Government
felt it had nt its

disposal in order to remain in power and to

'The Liberal government lost the general election in 1957
partly because of its alleged arrogance in cutting off all debate in
Parliament on the method of financing and construction of the TransCanada Pipeline. See William Kilbourn, P^pe Line(Toronto, 1970),
pp. 111-133.
United States Congress, Senate Committee Finance, Hearings
(Washington, September Ik, 15, 16, 20 and 21, 1965).

br-np the Agreement into effect in Canada with the least possible
political furor occurring as a result.
The government has had difficulty in giving an adequate
explanation for the fact, that <~ar prices in Canada are hicher than
in the United States,

Often the explanation."-; are similar if not

redundant and when compared to those offered by the automobile
industry they are contradictory.
have narrowed the price pap,

The Automobile Apreement may

although this argument is susoect

due to the fact that the cap in 1971 widened to the pre-Apreement
level.

There is another explanation for the price gap other than

those mentioned above which was never specifically stated, but was
inferred to mo by my informants in the public servic»,

The Auto-

mobile Apreement is a partial free trade arrangement and as such
hrts facilitated partial integration of the automobile industries
in Canada and the United States.

The two safeguards which Canada

idded to the Apreement assure Canada of a specific level of indigenous
automobile manufacturing, without complete integration-

One result

of the safeguards, it seems, is a slightly hipher price for automobiles purchased in Canada.

It can bvi argued that an additional

tt 2^0 for an automobile is not too high a price to pay to ensure
that the Canadian automobile industry continues to operate as more
than a mere distributing agent for a parent manufacturing company.
Without the production-to-sales ratio and value-added safeguards the

'Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, April, 26, 1Q72),
p. I64n.
W.J. Patrick Interview, February 11, 1972.
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ovpntuality mentioned above is not beyond the realm of Dossibilitv.
Th<* Canadian government, however, is deserving of censure for not
having the <-?indor to state that Canadians are required to pay a
price to ensure that wholly-owned subsidiary operations such as
those which constitute the automobile industry, continue to
manufacture in this country under the terms of even n partial free
trade agreement as it applied to North American automobile production.
1 would say that this nrice is reasonable as long as Canada does not
hove an indigenous automobile industry.
One of the reasons that the Canadian government negotiated
thf* Automobile Agreement was to rationalize the automobile industry,
stated succinctly, the government agreed with Canadian manufacturers
that "too many model lines were being produced for too small a domestic
market".

The Canadian safeguards added to the Agreement 3llowinp- the

rationalization of the automobile industry has meant that far fewer
model lines are manufactured in Canada than previous to the Agreement,
it is possible then that these cars would be manufactured in C-inadq
even though there might not be any Canadian demand for these modejs.
Conversely, the production of these particular models might cease
entirely if there were only a Canadian demand for them or the
Canadian demand might be met by manufacture in the United States
only.

The Automobile Agreement has made this type of nationalization

possible.

If the Automobile Agreement is abrogated, the rational-

ization it facilitated will have left the Canadian automobile consumer

Thorn interview, August 5» 1971.

with a smaiier model choice than was available before the Agreement,
a choice which may or may not meet Canadian driving needs.

An

atLempt. to provide a wider ranpe of models by Canadian manufacturers
will bring about the inefficiency which was so apparent in the
industry before 1961?.

The continental

rationalization of the

automobile industry has reinforced continental advertising of
automobiles.

Thus Canadians are urged to buy larger cars

in the

s*3me way that Americans are despite what seems to be the marked
Canadian preference for compact

cars.

The effect of this

relentless United States-b^sed advertising is the erosion of
distinctly Canadian tastes and vicariou^y the Canadian political
nationality.
By promoting continental rationalization thro'Jfh the Automobile Agreement, the Canadian government has also brought about
some morp tangible results.
g-eared

Since automobile production is now

to North American requirements, production derisions are

left virtually completely to the head offices of the automobile
manufacturers based in the United States.

The result for the

Canadian government is that its leverage with regard to anticombines legislation and/or cases of jxtra-territoriality is even
less meaningful than it was before the Agreement came into effect
and in fact such leverage may now be effectively reduced to the
point where Canada is limited to making protests which neither the
automobile industry nor the American government is likely to he^d.

l.A. l.itvak, op.cit., p. 159.

8
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The Automobile Apr^ement, by partially integrating the nroduction
of automobiles in North Am^ri-a, reinforces the notion that the
United -States Treasury Department has a legal right to prohibit
or at least to scrutinize the Canadian export of automobiles or
trucks which include United States-origin parts to third
9
countries.

Indeed such a case has already occurred as the

Treasury Department held up the sale of Ford of Canada trucks to
the Peoples Kepuoiic of China in 1%7.'
Similarly, the Automobile Agreement represents the
recognition by the Canadian government that, to cite a specific
example, Ford of Canada'R parent company in the United States has
the prerogative to decide which automobi Le models Ford of Canada
will produce in North America, as well as the prerogative to decide
what market rights Ford of Canada has in the rest of the world.
Thr example of the North American production of the Maverick by Ford
of Canada has already been cited.

For example, Ford of Canada has

market rights in ail British Commonwealth countries except for the
United Kingdom with the remainder of the world being reserved for
the parent United States Ford Company.
Further, the jobs of Canadian workers may now be tied
9
See, United States Treasury, Congressional Federal Kecord,
Title j>L, Foreign Assets Control Kegulations: ^00,204; and ^00,j5??
(Washington, 1969)*
Canadian House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, December lfc,
I9b7), P. 251**.
Ford Motor Company of Canada, Articles of incorporation
(Oakville, 1906).

L07
directly to marketing decisions which originate in the United States
and subsequently on the continental sale of the model lines these
workers produce.

It has already oeensh^'vn above that when a North

American industry covered by free trade, such as the farm implements
industry, slumps it is likely to be the Canadian workers who are
laid ol'i first.

1 have rited the exampLe of how Maesey-Ferguson

dealt with a general production cutback in february, 1^71, by
laying off 1,200 workers at its Canadian subsidiary operation while
only ihQ were laid off at the wassey-Ferguson parent company in the
United states.

12

Another tangible result is that the Canadian government has
come to realize after ^resident Nixon's economic moves on August i^>,
l^Vl, that it cannot discuss the Autouiotaiie Ap-reement with the United
states in isolation from other trade inters between the two "ountriep,
'Pre Canad^-ir p-overnment has fonnd thaf rationalizing ^ s own automobile
industry is directly related to its entire trading relationship with
the Un*ted States, especially when the Americans consider that by so
doing the Canadians have hoodwinked their "neighbours" into pcceptinr
what the American government considers to be an ursati-.factory
arrangement.
It is dif'icult to imagine that the Canadian government was
naive enough to beijeve that the Automobile Agreement would l-'st
forever.

No matter what happens to the Ap-reement, the rationalization

of the Canadian automobile industry has barked the government into a

"Massey-Ferguson Announces Layoffs", Toronto Daily .Star,
February 10, 1973.

corner.

On the one hand the government has removed itself still

further from havinr uny direr*- influence on the indurtry's
production decisions for this country and their effect bemuse of
the integration which tns occurred as a resuLt of the Apreement.
On the other hand, if f he ^rreemont were ended Canadians generally
would have fewer models from which to choose.

The automobile

industry in Canada would be in the same position as it was before
1965 except that it would hove a substantially narrower range of
products to offer to its Canadian customers and no competitive
access to the American market.

This development might be advan-

tageous if the effective decision-making for the automobile industry
in this country were patria*ed.

There is no guarantee th^t these

circumstances would take pl«c«> upon the abrogation of the Agreement
or if they did, + o what extent they might be ndvantageous.
The Canadian government learned on August IS, 1971 . that
even bilateral agreements such as the Automobile Agreement are
indirectly affected when the American government turns inward to
stimulate its domestic manufacturing industries.

The Automobii0

Agreement and the products it exempts from duty in Canada and the
United States were not directly affected by the imposition of the
10 percent surcharge on imports announced by President Nixon in
August, 1971.

The Canadian government is well aware, and has been

lor some time, that the United States Administration is dissatisfied
with the Agreement as it exists.

There can be little doubt that the

measures taken on August IS, 1971, though world-wide in design,
served to put particular pressure on Canada for the purpose of
altering this specific irritant to the United States, i.e., the
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Automobile Agreement.
The timing of ^resident Nixon's announcement is important.
Trade taJks between Canada and the United States had already been
scheduled for the first two weeks of November, 1971. and one of the
primary topics to be discussed at these meetings was th» Automobile
Ap-reement, The surcharge did not affect the Agreement directly,
but it did affect all but a few sectors of the trade between the
two countries so that in effect, Canada was invited by the
application of the surcharge to make trade concessions to the United
.States which would be negotiated at the .joint meeting.

From the

Canadian response to fresiuent Nixon's measures it can be implied
that revision of the Automobile Agreement was one of the trade concessions that the United .States Administration wanted Canada to make.
The Canadian government's response was threefold.

I7:

F^rst,

the povernment made its traditional pilgrimage to Washington to ask
that Canada be exempted from the surcharge.
refused outright.

This the Americans

Second, the Canadian government prepared

to

offe>- support to Canadian industries affected by the surcharge in
the form of the employment Support Bill.

1*+

Third, the government

-simply out-waited the United states until the surcharge was
dropped on December lb, 1971, without having to negotiate changes
in the Automobile Agreement.

The government was able to resist the

For a description of the events on and after August 1^>,
1971 see "The Week of the Great Ultimatum", Maclean's Magazine,
Vol. 85, no. *>, March 1972.
Canada, house of Commons, Debates (Ottawa, September 13,
14, lb, and 16,1971). The bill allowed tax deferrments and exemptions
from tax to companies resident in Canada which were adversely affected
by the surcharge with a view to keepinp- the products of such companies
competitive in the United States market.

110
ovoral I pr<*Rvure

to change the Agreement without making trade

roncesfiionr, bu'. by so doinp it strengthened the American resolv»
•o explore other ways by which the same end could be achieved.

The

American government has effectively circumvented the Automobile Agreement by mesne, of the "DISC" program which has already been mentioned.
The response of the Canadian government, namely:
of May 8, 197?, indicates that this is the case.

15

the budget

The government

offered tax concessions to all manufacturers including the automobile
manufacturers just as the American "DISC" program was offered to all
Urited states-based industries "including the automobile industry.
the "DTSC" program had no potential of circumventing

f

If

he Automobile

Agreement presumably the American government would not have offered
it to the automobile manufacturers as a method of rebuilding the
United States surplus in trode in automobiles with Canada.

By the

sam" token the Canadian government would not have included Canadian
automobile manufacturers in its budget incentives program if the
government felt that the "DISC" program did not have the potential
to circumvent the Agreement as it applies to th^se Canadian manufacturers.
The United States government wants to change it.s overall tradingrelationship with Canada in a way which is favourable to th** United
States.

The Automobile Agreement is an obstacle to the achievement of

the kind of trading arrangement the United States wants with Canada.
In this sense, the Canadian government's overall bargaining position
with regard to trade matters is undercut to the point where Canada is

Jean-Luc Pep->n, The Ottawa Journal, April 29, 197?.

limited to r^i-t^n" to Ar.eri<-an initiatives to change the status quo.
Obviously, the future of the Automobile Agreement itself i <* suspect
under such ri re Jirstancer ind it is unlikely that, the presentation of
v +»*ade rtatist cs

If

by the Canadian /ovrnmf nt with -egard to

automobile production is likely to sway the thinkinr ">f the American
p-'vernmen^ toward ^ep-ardinp; the Agreement as anything but -j bad deal
f T them.
^he pressure of the Canadian government to change its t^de
relationship with the United States toward free trade is increased
rather than lessened by bilateral trade arrangements such as the
Automobile Agreement when the United Ftates turns inward to shore up
i+s economy.

Tt is quite l^k^ly that the Onadian government can

only counter move just ro far until it is

faced with the choice of

changing the Automobile Agreement in ways favouring the United jtat*»s
or chanp-inf r'anada,r- overall trading relationship with the United States.
The Canadian p-overnment would prefer to do neither, but this is the
least likely possibility of all.
The Automobile Agreement does, however, bring into the open
the basic dilemma as to whether Canada shouLd pursue an increasingly
integrated trade and economic rclationshio with the United States or
whether Canada should be attempting to make basic changes in the
relationship •oward increased Canadian autonomy.

Bv bringing the

dilemma into the open, the political decisions made in the pursuit of
either course become at the same time more critical and more subject

C .E . n eigie, op.ci.t. , p. 87.
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to debite bpciuae of fhe °xn' rience gained from what I vould call
bilateral experiments like the Automobile Agreement.
A further consequence faced by the Canadian government is
the decline of its influence on the automobile industry which has
come about as a result of the Automobile Agreement.

Prior to 1 % 5

( ->nadians purchased 7.5 percent of the automobiles produced in
\'orth America yearly, while Canadians manufactured k.b

percent of

the tot^l number of cars put on the North American market each year. 17
The Canadian government felt that the Automobile Agreement and
particularly the production-to-sales ratio would narrow this gap an^
attain what has been called n "fiir and equitable" share of North
A-nerican automobile production.

What has happened is that the gap

mentioned above has narrowed slighfy.

Canadian? continue to purchase

7.S percent of th° automobiles produced in North Imer-' ra,

and Canada

n-<w manufactures 5 percent of the total North American output of
automobiles.

Production decisions regarding the number and types

of models manufactured in Canada aro now rmde virtually exclusively
in the United States; and the American government wants a new trading
arrangement.

Thus, the Canadian government, through the Automobile

Agreement, has not only given up its influenre over automobile
production in this country, but has also provoked American dissatisfaction with regard to its trade relations with Canada.
/The Canadian government has lost its direct influence over

17

W.J. Patrick interview, February 11, 197?.

18...,

j
*
l
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the automobile industrv in this country because since l<)bb the
industry has been prompted to function as a North ^moricnn entity
with locus of decision-makinp for that entity moving increasingly
*o the United States. The economic benefits accruing to the automobile industry, as a result of this shift, are apparent. There
arr- ,-Jt the same time, however, political shortcomings.

Production

decisions which originate in the United States for the automobile
industry in Canada deny the validity of promoting, by political
19
me^ns, Canadian ownership of Canadian business,
and of removing
export limitations imposed on Canadian subsidiary operations, not to
mention the development of Canadian manarers of international business
as well as scientific, engineering and technical support personnel in
•such business.

These elements are indiepensible in the development

of a Canadian industrial strategy which serves Canada's political
and long term economic interests.
As production in the automobile industry has become integrated
to a North American context the north-south flow of commerce between
Canada and the United States has been reinforced at the expense of
Canada's pattern of national integration established on an east-west
basis of commercial flow. At the same time, integration in the
automobile industry has brought about the demand by the United States
leadership of the international automobile workers union that its

l.A. Litvak, op.cit., p. 6|?. The percentage of foreign
ownership of Ford of Canada has increased since 1965• Litvak
notes that in 1964 Ford-Canada was a 7^.9 percent owned subsidiary
of Ford Motor Company Incorporated (ie. Ford-U.S.). In 1969 this
percentage had increased to 8l percent ownership by Ford-U.S. The
other 19 percent of Ford-Canada is owned in Canada.
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Canadian membership should be paid wages on a par with those of the
American membership and which are adjusted to American tax and
monetary conditions.

Neither of the^e phenomena are in Canada's

political, interest since they do not lend themselves to the development of appropriate Canauian wage policies and independent tax and
monetary policies, but it seems clear that these objectives will
not be realized in the automobile industry in this country during
the life of the Automobile Agreement in its present form.

The

Canadian government cannot effectively implement economic policies
which

T P designed to achieve political interests of the kind

mentioned above f>c Jong as the production decisions for the automobile
industry in Canada are made outside this country.
°omp Canadian automobile workers have become much more
nationalistic as a result of the Agreement.

As mentioned above, n

r""oi'p of Canadian automobile workers headed by Larry Haiven of
Windsor, Ontarao have called for the separation of the Canadian UAW
*>om the United States-based international n AW.

Mr. fiaiven's group,

the "Canadians to f^olirh the HAW Autopact Committee", hap also
20
cilied for the abrogation of the Agreement itself.

Dennis

M;0f»rrott, Canadian president of the UAW, is sympathetic with Mr.
Haivc's position although he is not as forthright.

Mr. MrDermott

has called for increased autonomy for the Canadian 'JAW in response
to the assertions by +h" American president of the UAW internationnl
union, Leonard Woodcock, that the United States membership sees the
Larry Haivon, The Windsor Star, June ?b,

1972.

U5
Agrpp-TPnt as the means to protect the job^ of its United States
rembership.
I', has been mentioned above that the Canadian automobile
manufacturers are now ahl«* to meet the rovernmen*'s value-added
'••affifruard through payrolls and inventories alone with the result
+ *-,->*- nart^ for new cars may be brought into Canada duty free.

As

a result, the parent f •* rms of the Canadian automobile manufacturers
now can supply virtually all the parts which their subsidiaries
require from plants operating in the United States.

Another result

is that the Canadian parts manufacturers have increased difficulty
of access to the American market because of the American industry's
preference to buy parts "in house" and because the Canadian parts
producers cannot achieve a volume of production sufficient to compete
with their American counterparts.

The net effect is that the parts

manufacturers are being forced out of business at worst, or are
havinp to curtail their operations at best.
As mentioned above A. D. Hales, the Progressive Conservative
critic in the House of Commons, cited the case of Inpersoll Machine
and Tool which was forced out of business because i t could not
compete in the United States automotive parts market after the

22
Automobile Agreement came into effect in 1965*

A.J. Wallace

informed me that Earl Wobinson Auto Parts of Oshawa had lost about

?i

Dennis McDermott, The Windsor Star, June 27, 1972.

??
A.D. Ha1es, Remarks to the Progressive Conservatiye
Caucus Committee on^Industry (Ottawa, March 26, 1965).
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one-fhi"d of its business as a result of the automobile manufacturers•
d*"-j si or- to shift the source of supply of these parts to the United
23
r

"tat»s after the Agreement rame into effect.

An example of the

fact that the automotive parts industry generally in Canada has not
been expanding is that capital expenditures for repairs and expansion

2k

have declined in the industry since the Agreement came into effect.

Because the automobile industry has lived up fully to the provisions
of the Automobile Agreement, the Canadian government cannot provide
direct heir to th° parts rranufacturers in this country.
T4 has TI ready been mentioned (see Chapter ITJ) that the value
of -automotive parts exports f^om Canada has increased, at the same
time, however, + he import of automotive parts to Canada has increased
pvpn more drastically and it appears that it will be the large
Canadian subsidiaries of United States-based automotive parts firms
«=u<~h as Kelsey-Hayes of Windsor and Budd Automotive of Kitchener,

2b

which wiLI reap the greatest share of these benefits.

It should not be inferred from the above discussion that Canada
is powerless to do anything about the position in which it finds itself
because of the Agreement.

The government has offered tax concessions

23
Wallace I n t e r v i e w , August 12, 1 9 7 1 .
2k
Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics* 6l-20r>, Capital
and Repair Expenditures (Ottawa, May, 1971)• The capital
expenditures amounted to ft 88.9 million in 1965 and in 1969 these
same expenditures amounted to ft 79-6 million.

2b
1968.

"Report on Business", Toronto Globe and Mail, May

20,

]
to all the manufacturing industries including the automobile industry
throurh the budget speech of Miy 8, 1972, in the hope that possible
reductions in automobile production as a result of the United States
"DISC" Drogram will be offset in this country by the tax inducements
announced by Mr.

Turner.

The government should be fully prepared

to see another initiative similar to "DISC" introduced by the United
.States government if the Canadian tax concessions are successful in
rnaintaJnine automobile production in Canada and exports to the United
states at their present levels.
The Canadian government has offered Regional Incentive Grants
to Canadian parts manufacturers, but this response would seem to be
of limited value since the American government has threatened to
apply countervailing duties arguing that the Canadian government's
incentive program gives Canadian producers an unfair advantage in
competing with American producers in the United States market.

The

United States government has recently made such a response in the
case of the French-owned Michelin Tire Company of Nova Scotia, a
company which has been suosidized by jrrants of money from the
Canadian Department of Regional Economic Expansion.

The Michelin

Company has been granted what the American government has called an
"unfair competitive advantage" when the company exports tires to the
United States market."
The Canadian government's response to its loss of influence
on the automobile industry as a whole is likely to be successful in

See the comments of John Petty, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury, The Ottawa Journal, April 29, 1972.
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the short term only.

The United States is determined that the

Automobile ^preernent, which it believes has brought about an
unsatisfactory trade arrangement, must be altered.

In the long

term, Canada would seem to have two choices with regard to the
Automobile Agreement, nameiy:

change the treaty in a mutually

.-icceptable way; or abrogate the treaty entirely.
The Canadian government has talked about changing the
Agreement in terms of expanding it to include other items such as
tires which were not included in the original Agreement, while the
27
Agreement as it presently stands would remain the same.

The

United States government is less vague about the way in which it
would change the Agreement. The Americans want the Canadian safe-"
guards to be removed and thev want the private Canadian consumer, asj
well as Canadian manufacturers and retailers, to be able to import
automobiles from the United States,

Given this fundamental

difference, the only other option which appears open to the Canadian
government is the abrogation of the Agreement.

Whichever course the

Canadian government chooses to follow, the economic and political
effects are bound to be serious.
The Canadian government negotiated the Automobile Agreement t
with a view to eliminating the gap between production and sales of
automobiles in the North American market. The Automobile Agreement

27
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., pp. 123-138. The interviews with
D.C. Thorn and Bert Barr confirmed that this is the kind of change
which the puolic service would recommend to the government.
?R

United States Congress, senate Committee on Finance,
hearings (Washington, September ik i^« 16, 20 and 21, 1965),
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has from tp« beginning, h e m

-> modified fro*1 trade ap-eement wr4-'

is contingent on special "omtri t.ments (i.e. the safrpjards) from the
autnmobi'p industry to the Can^d'in government.

The Agreement har

narrowed .-slightly the gap between production and sales, but has nit
<• ' -,",-< iated it.

Consideration must be given to the consequence

o F the Canadian government dropping the safeguards in o r d T to
maintain the Agreement.
The government ofrici n i ^ .vith whom I spoke were in concert
in this regard.

D.C

Thnm

nii:

"foreign competition would be wide

open in Canada, *" T " j *-ion of the entirp industry would ensue".
He made i*- "i»=ir that the disruption could be so extensive as to
reduce the automobile manufacturing industry in Canada to a series
of di«*tn h- f* n« warehouses for automobiles which are produced in
other countries.

No Canadian government could easily overcome the

economic impact of having a major reverue rource so decimated.

Ry

the same token, the automohile industry is also of key importing
because of the capital it generates and disperses.

v

e t , if the

production rafeguards were dropped, these functions of the automobile
industry in Canada would be severely cut if not entirely eliminated.
Further, no Canadian government would want to risk throwing more
than 80,000 Canadians employed in automobile manufacturing out of
work when a chronic unemployment rate of 6 percent is already a
political issue while these workers are employed.

W.J. Patrick Interview, February 11, 1972.
Thorn Interview, August 3» 1971•
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/
Bert Harr acknowledged that if there is to be a CanadaU-n ted ntatep ^itomobile Agreement there "have to be s^fesruards to \
control production and employment in C a m d a . "
Mr. Thorn that ^

He agreed with

Automobile Agreement without safeguards would

H«»fini tely he economically disastrous for f'anada and that economic
effects would bring about political repercussions.
It i<* my opinion that these repercussions would involve the
overall relationship between Canada and the United States rather
than the defeat of a Canadian government at the polls as a result
of having dropped the safeguards.

The latter possibility is,

however, far from being beyond the realm of possibility.

Canada's

maintenance of the safeguards to date represents this country's

\
j
j

unwillingness to permit the level of automobile manufacturing here
to be determined solely on decisions made in American head offices.
ft th» same time, the safeguards militate against the possibility
tHat the United States parent automotive firms might distort derisions
based on market forces to raise production beyond what the market
could actually support.

Tn a noli tical climate where nationalist

opinion such as expressed by the Waffle, and the Committee for an
Independent Canada is so intense, it is unlikely that any government
could survive maintaining th» Agreement without the kind of protection
mentioned above.
Tt is my view that the Automobile Agreement is likely to
have direct and immediate political repercussions only if a Canadian
government ailowed the Agreement to evolve into a free trade arrangement

Parr Interview, August 3, 1971.

1?1
;

n -tutomob: lo trade faptwen Omada and the United states.

Given

"i Fon.-niiR and effective criticism of Riich a" -irranp-ement by a
viable, alternative opposition party, it is birhly probable that
•i r«nervil pU'f-l ini rn'i I d b" forced on n ^ ^ an issue and that the
rovernmen* which inifTted
'. ffir-e.

r

nrh a nroprif could be voted out of

The experience of the Liberal government of Wilfrid Laurier

in L911 myy be used as ar indicator of the prospects for a Canadian
p-ovprnment which advocates free trade with the U^it^i States.
As a partial free trade arrangement the Automobile Agreement
has been ^nbi»ct to relatively little criticism, especially with
regard to its political implications.

The rriticiRm of Conrervative

A. D. H'<les on just these grounds has been muted by the automobile
industry in this country while the Agreement has been effect.

As a

result, the Conservative party no longer argues for the abrogation of
the Agreement.

Instead, the Conservative party has become n voice

foi- the Caradian automotive parts manufacturers who have suffered
a result of the A freemen t.

The Conservatives have there for*1 be

implicit supporters of the Agreement and the introduction of the
Transitional Ad]ustment Benefits scheme for parts manufacturers by
the Liberol p-overnment is an effective and disarming political
response to the cri'icism by the Conservatives.

The defeat of the Laurier government by Robert Borden and
the Conservatives was due in large part to the advocacy of free
trade with the United states by the Liberal p arty. See. J.M.S. Careless,
The Canadians: i867 - 196? 'Toronto* 196V).
THles Interview, February l8, 1971.

Neither has the N»w Democractic *"arty criticized the Agrae<^
m~n+ on the basis of its political effects or because of the way
it inhibits the potential, development of a Canadian industrial
strategy.

The T.A.B. funds were also made available to automobile

workers who suffered dislocation is a result of the Agreement and
thereby defused the original criticism of the Agreement of the
New Democratic Party spokesman Reid Scott.

Kdward Broadbent, who

is Mr. Scott's successor as the New Democratic Party critic of the
Agreement, has affiled for a strengthening of the production safeguards
wriich are attached to the Agreement.

Since most of Mr. Broadbent's

constituents (in Oshawa-Whitby) are employed in the automotive
industry, it would be difficult for him to argue for the abrogation
of a trade ar^nperaent which has increased employment among his
electors.

Mr. Broadbent's arguments do indicate an implicit

recognition by him tnat the safeguards are the only guarantee that
Canada has that automobile manufacturing will continue in this country
35
while the Agreement is in effect. "
The economic benefits realized by the automobile industry
through the Agreement, combined with the effective muting by the
liberal government, of such political opposition to the Agreement
as did arise, have effectively overshadowed criticism which ir based
on Canada's lonp term political interests or on the need for the
Canadian government to develop an industrial strategy which encourages

3^
Canada, House of Commons, Debates ("Ottawa, A p r i l 2 ^ , 1972),
p . 1680.
It should be noted that Mr. Broadbent's position is more to
the left than that taken by some of his colleagues in the N.D.P. on
trade matters. See Max Saltsman in Abraham Rotstein (ed.)
An Industrial Strategy for Canada (Toronto, 1 9 7 ? K

1?1

the full utilization of Canada's human resources.
Opposition critics of the Agreement in the House of Commons,
government officials, and spokesmen in the public service are opposed
in general, to a free trade arrangement in automobiles and parts with
the United States. The American administration is equally determined
that free trade in automobiles and parts will replace the present
Automobile Agreement. Given this choice the Canadian government's
best choice would seem to be the abrogation of the Agreement to help
ensure the automobile oroduction is continued in this country rather
than just the distribution of automobiles.

In choosing this alternative

the government will have taken a step toward maintaining the viability
of Canada's political nationality and at the same time such a decision
n-ay well provide the government with the opportunity to embark on the
development of a Canadian industrial strategy which is designed in
Canada to meet Canadian requirements.
The Automobile Agreement is instructive to the Canadian
^

government in two wnys.

First, the Agreement demonstrates that

rationalization in a sector of industry can be carried out at the
encouragement of the government. The rationalization process can
bring about the long range development of a particular industry in
Canada more readily if the process is carried out within Canada
according to Canadian political and economic needs. Second, the
Agreement points out that a bilateral trade agreement made between
Canada and the United States which is restricted to a particular
industry sector tends to limit the Canadian government's influence
on that sector of industry, particularly when that sector of industry

operates as wholly owned subsidiaries of United States-based
operations.
Prior to the signing of the Automobile Agreement in 1965.
the Canadian automobile industry was a replica in miniature of the

J

United States automobile industry. The Automobile Agreement does
give the Canadian automobile industry access to the United States
automobile market, but the Canadian industry itself has been rationalized in such a way that it can only prow according to the North
American demand for the automobiles manufactured in Canada, rather
than developing •according to the Canadian demand and taste for
snecific automobile models which could be produced in this country.
The long-term development of Canada is not served by the Automobile
Agreement which intef-rates the Canadian demand and taste in automobiles to North American standards set in the United States beyond
the direct influence of the Canadian people.
The automobile industry in both Canada and the United states
is the chief supporter of the Automobile Agreement which encourages
a more integrated North Amoricar automobile industry.

The irdur.try

supports the Agreement because the Canadian industry is integrated
in a more economical North /m^riran ^<-heme of production.
The Canadian political assessment of the Automobile Agreement
is that it is successful and worthwhile because the efficiency of the
automobile industry in Canada has increased, the number of Canadians
employed in the industry has risen slightly, and the deficit in
Canada's automobile trade balance with the United States has been
reduced rlightly.

On the othe** hand, production decisions and taste

formation is not directly subject to Canadian requirements, Canadian
workers through their international union leadership have demanded
wage parity and job security with their American counterparts, and
Canada has found that the United States objects to the continuation
of the Agreement because the Canadian trade deficit in automobiles
has been reduced although not eliminated.

The Canadian production

"safeguards" have contributed to each of these situations, but more
important, the safeguards encourage only the growth rather than the
development of the Canadian automobile industry according to the
growth overall in North America of the automobile industry.
The United States political assessment of the Automobile
Agreement is one of dissatisfaction.

The United States government

would prefer a free trade agreement in the automobile industry in
Canada. The production "safeguards" in the Agreement have aroused
American ire because these prevent free trade which the United States
seems to think it was bargaining for in 196i> and because the "safeguards" have reduced the American surplus in automobile trade with
Canada.

It seems to me that the main reason the United States has not

moved directly to abrogate the Automobile Agreement is the influence
of the American automobile industry, which, as I have pointed out,
is fully satisfied with the Agreement.
Canada and the United States have not yet altered the
Automobile Agreement via normal negotiations. Instead, the United
States has initiated a series of trade measures which do not put
direct pressure on the Automobile Agreement, but which do attempt to
elicit trade concessions from Canada. The Canadian government has
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responded to the United States' ten percent surcharge on imports and
"DISC1 programs, not by altering or ending the Automobile Agreement
which is what the United States seems to want, but rather by subsidizing
the operation of Canadian industry in the United States market through
the Employment Support Bill and through the tax incentives provided
for the industry in the May 1972 budget.
The Canadian government found that the rationalization of
the automobile industry in this country on a North American basis
has meant that this country purchases 7»5 percent of the overall
North American automobile production just as was the case prior to
I965.

The Canadian automobile industry now meets 5 percent of that

demand compared to ^.5 percent before the Automobile Agreement came
into effect. The Canadian government should learn that the United
States government is interested in trade arrangements such as the
Automobile Agreement to the extent that the latter feels a surplus
in trade cot'ld be maintained or increased by such an arrangement.
The chances of the United States achieving a trade surplus are,
it seems to me, dramatically improved when a free trade arrangement
is negotiated in an industry sector which has American-based parent
companies.
The Automobile Agreement i6 like any other policy that is
developed in that the actual policy in its working form does not
distinguish between what the policymakers intended and what the

output of the policy process actually turns out to be. On the basis
of the evidence which I have examined, I submit that the output of the
Automobile Agreement undermines the val-'ditv of those non-economic
motivations which I have defined as Canada's political interests.
Furthermore, the output of the Automobile Agreement, to the extent
that it inhibits the development of a Canadian industrial strategy
"imilar in kind to the one mentioned above, denies Canadians the
freedom to set their own priorities.
The Automobile Agreement serves further to entrench automobile
production and consumer taste for automobiles on a north-south axis
and in a North American context. The reluctance of Canadian automobile
manufacturers to serve certain markets, because these markets are
legally unavailable to their American parent firms, is reinforced
rather than discouraged by the Agreement.

The Agreement therefore

restricts Canadian international trade and vicariously Canadian foreign
relations.

A further result of the Automobile Agreement is the demand

for wage parity by the automobile workers union.

Such a demand does

not allow for the development of appropriate Canadian wage and social
security policies in the automobile industry in Canada as long as the
Agreement which was the catalyst for this demand, remains in existence.
As a result of the integrative nature of the Automobile Agreement, it
seems likely that a pricing policy will be developed within the automobile industry for all of North America, there is as yet no direct
evidence of this phenomenon, which does not adhere directly to
Canadian tax and monetary policies. I contend that none of these
outputs of the Automobile Agreement are in Canada's long term poiiticai
interest.

As a result of the Automobile Agreement, the locus of
decision-making for the Canadian automobile is more than ever based
in the United States. This result of the Agreement restricts the
development of Canadian management skills within the automobile
industry in Canada.

As a result of the Agreement, research and

development in the automobile industry has moved exclusively to the
United States which clearly retards the development of Canadian
engineering, technical, and scientific personnel engaged in research
and development within the automobile industry in this country.
The Automobile Agreement has not promoted Canadian participation in
the ownership of the Canadian automobile industry, nor was it the
intention of the Agreement to do so. Nor has the existence of the
Automobile Agreement had any affect on the export limitations which
continue to apply to the Canadian automobile industry.

The net

output of the Automobile Agreement is to move the thrust of Canadian
policy away from, rather than toward, the maximum development of
Canadian human and industrial resources as integral facets of a
Canadian industrial strategy.
After the Presidential election in the United States in
November, 1972, and after the general election which is expected in
Canada in 1972, there will likely be drastic changes made in the
Automobile Agreement.

I agree with Mr. Barr that the present safe-

guards are going to be dropped,

and the most likely mutually

convenient time is immediately after an election in each country.

garr Interview, August 3» 1971.

.-ovli«»d tfnt the government of each country has a strong mandate
with which t.n negotiate.

Unlike Mr. Barr, T cannot see how replace-

ment safeguards can be impJemented which would at the same time
guarantee C-ir>'idian control over automobile production and a favou^abl^
bqlani-e of t.radp position for the United States with regard to North
American automobile production.
that by 197^

It is a distinct possibility then

the Automobile Agreement will be abrogated despite

D.C. Thorn's statement that this eventuality is "inconceivable without
some kind of replacement"'

in view of the speoiali7ntion which has

occurred in the Canadian segment of the industry and in view of the
reappiicable tariff,

'i'here is no doubt that the abrogation of the

Automobile Agreement would bring about political and economic changes
and even dislocation, but T do not believe these effects would be
permanent nor do they necessarily need to be disastrous.
The abrogation of the Automobile Agreement would leave the
automobile industry, eventually, about in the position it was in
196^, except that the industry is much more specialized.

The govern-

ment would do well to encourage and perpetuate the kind of specialization which has developed in the automobile industry in Canadr,
For example, American Motors now produces seven automobile models
in Canada, compared to the twenty-one models it manufactured ir
Canada prior to ^ o S .

There will be no need for a national

publicly-ewned automobile company in Canada as long as th^ automobile
industry which presently operates in Canada is able to meet and

"*7
' One year's notice is required if either country wishes to
abrogate the Agreement, see the Appendix.
Thorn Interview, August 3i 1971.

130
specialize in whnt seems to be the Canadian preference for compact
grd middle-si 7.« automobiles.

Tn this way, the Automobile Agreement

could reach its most fruitful conclusion in Canada. On the other
l.Tid, the government may wish to apply some or all of the recommendations of the Pladen commission to the Canadian automobile industry
ro as to attempt to expand the industry by "making removal of the
tariff on imports conditional upon export performance",39 as
Dean Bladen suggested.
The development of the automobile industry suggests a course
of action which the Canadian government should undertake not only on
behalf of the automobile industry, but on behalf of all industry in
Canada in order to ensure that all industry in Canada is responsive
to Canadian needs. The government should require full financial
disclosure of all Canadian operations including foreign controlled
corporate entities. Further, the Canadian government should ensure
that fulL cost pricing, both in and out, is required in all Canadian
r.ubridinp operations so that the parent firm is made aware that it
is doing business in a foreign country and so that greater financial
autonomy and the promotion of Canadian equity becomes a feature of
such operations. The government should direct that Canadians be
made members of the boards of directors of all industry operating
in Canada and that some of these people should not otherwise be
associated with the particular company on whose board they serve.
The Canadian government should order the liberalization of tax
laws to facilitate the training of Canadian managerial personnel

39
C.E. Beigie, op.cit., p. 39.
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who will serve in Canada upon the completion of their training,
particularly in international business operations.

Finally, the

Canadian government, in concert with other countries which
experience similar difficulties, should order that all foreignowned subpidiaries should be required to abide by Canadian law
and policy, whenever these Laws 'ire in conflict with the law,
policy ana financial disclosure requirements of the country of
the parent fi^m.
If the Automobile Agreement leads to action of this type
by the Canadian government, Canada's future economic and political
requirements are more likely to be achieved according to Canadian
specifications.

Perhaps the most fruitful outcome of the Automobile

'p-r^ement would be the realization by the Canadian government and by
the Canadian nublic that the viability of Canada's political
nationality is at least as important as the economic well-being
of Canada's cornorate citizens and that those considerations should
be

viewed as being complementary to each other.

1PPFNDTX A

AGREEMENT CONCERNTNG AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS
BETWEEN ^HE COVFRNMENT AN^ TH*" TTNITED STATES OF <VMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Ganada,
Determined to st-engthen t^c economic relations between
their two countries;
Recognizing that this can best be irhieved through the
stimulation of economic growth ind through the expansion of markets
available to producers in both countries within the fran^work of
the established policy of both countries of promoting multilateral
trade;
Recognizing that an expansion of trade c m hest be achieved
throvgh the reduction or elimirntior of tariff and all o^-he** barriers
to trade ope*v:ting *o impede or distort the full and efficient
development of each country's trade and industrial potenti.-l;
"ecognizing the important place that the automotive
industry occupies in the industrial economy of the two countries
and the interests of industry, labor and consumers in sustaining
high levels of efficient production and continued growth in the
automotive industry;
Agree as follows:
Article I
The Governments of the United States -and Canada, pursuant
to the above principles, shall seek the early achievement of the
following objectives:
(a) The creation o f a broader market for automotive
products within which the fuLl benefits of rpTialnzation and
1 ">rge-scale production can be achieved;
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(b) The liberalization of United States and Canadian
automotive trade in respect of tariff barriers and other
f-ictors tending to impede it, with a view to enabling the
industries of both countries to participate on a fair and
equitabie basis in the expanding total market of the two
countri es;
(c) The development of conditions in which market forces
may operate effectively to attain the most economic pattern
of investment, production and trade.
T

t sh^Jl be the policy of each Government to avoid
actionw which would frustrate the achievement of these objectives.

Article II
(a) The Government of Canada, not later than the entry into
force of the legislation contemplated in paragraph (b) of this
Article, shall accord duty-free treatment to imports and products of
the United States described in Annex A.
(b) The Government of the United States, during the session
of the United States Congress commencing on January k, 196% shall
seek enactment of legislation authorizing duty-free treatment of
imports of the products of Canada described in Annex B. In sepkinfc
ruch legislation, the Government of the United States shall also seek
authority permitting the implementation of such duty-free treatment
retroactively to the earliest date administratively possible
following the date upon which the Government of Canada has accorded
duty-free treatment. Promptly after the entry into force of such
legislation, the Government of the Urited States shall accord dutyfree treatment to the products of Canada described in Annex B.

Article ITT
Th° commitments made by the two Governments in this Agreement shall not preclude action by either Government consistent with
its obligations under Po-t TI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade.

Article TV
(a) At any time, at the request of either Government, the
two Government shall consult with respect to any matter relating to
this Apreement.
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(b) Without Limiting the foregoing, the two Governments
shalL, at the request of either Government, consult with respect
to any problems which may arise concerning automotive producers
in the United States which do not at present have facilities in
Canada for the manufacture of motor vehicles, and with respect to
the implications for the operation of this Agreement of new automotive producers becoming established in Canada.
(c) No later than January 1, 1968, the two Governments
shall jointly undertake a comprehensive review of the progress
made towards achieving the objectives set forth in Article I.
During this review the Governments shall consider such further
steps as may be necessary to desirable for the full achievement
of these ab.jectives.

Article V
Access to the United States and Canadian markets provided
for under this Agreement may by agreement be accorded on similar
t^rms to other countries.

Article VI
This Agreement shall enter into force provisionally on the
date of signature and definitively on the date upon which notes are
exchanged between the two Governments giving notice that appropriate
action in their respective legislatures has been completed.

Article VII
This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration. Each
Government shall however have the right to terminate this Agreement
twelve months from the date on which that Government gives written
notice to the other Government of its intention to terminate the
Agreement.
In witness whereof the representatives of the two Governments
have signed this Agreement.
Done in duplicate at Johnson City, Texas, this lbth day of
January 1965, in English and French, the two texts being equally
authentic.
For the Government of the United States of America:
For the Government of Canada:-
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Annex A
(i)

Automobiles; when imported by a manufacturer of automobiles.

(?)

All parts, and accessories and parts thereof, except tires
and tubes, when imported for use as original equipment in
automobiles to be produced in Canada by a manufacturer of
automobiles.

(3) Buses, when imported by a manufacturer of buses.
(M

All parts, and accessories and parts thereof, except tires
and tubes, when imported for use as original equipment in
buses to be produced in Canada by a manufacturer of buses.

(5)

Specified commercial vehicles, when imported by a manufacturer of specified commercial vehicles.

(6) All parts, and accessories and parts thereof, except tires,
tubes and any machines or other articles required under
Canadian tariff item k'j>8a to be valued separately under the
tariff items regularly applicable thereto, when imported
for use as original equipment in specified commercial vehicles
to produced in Canada by a manufacturer of specified commercial
vehicles.
(1)

"Automobile" means a four-wheeled passenger automobile having
a seating capacity for not more than ten persons;

(?)

"Base year" means the period of twelve months commencing on
the 1st day of Aupust, 1963 and ending on the 31st day of
July, 1964;

(3)

"Bus" means a passenger motor vehicle havinp a seating capacity
for more than 10 persons, or a chassis therefor, but does not
include any following vehicle or chassis therefor, namely an
electric trackless trolley bus, amphibious vehicle, tracked or
half-tracked vehicle or motor vehicle designed primarily for
off-highway use;

(k)

"Canadian value added" has the meaning assigned by regulations
made under section 275 of the Canadian Customs Act;

(b)

"Manufacturer" of vehicles of any following class, namely
automobiles, buses or specified commercial vehicles, means, in
relation to any importation of goods in respect of which the
description is relevant, a manufacturer that

1*
(i)

(n)

C6)

produced vehicles of that class in Canada in each of
the four consecutive three month*-' periods is the base
year, and
product vehicles <-><" that rlass in Canada in the period
of twelve months ending on the 31st da^ <-,<" July in which
the importation is made,
'A)

the "atio o*" +vie net sales value of which to the net
sales va^ue of all vehicles of that class sold for
consumption in Canada by the manufacture** in that
period is equal to or higher than the ratio of the
net sales value of all vehicles of that class produced
in Canada by the manufacturer in the base y^ar to the
net sales value of all vehicles of that class -sold for
consumption in Canada by the manufacturer in the base
year, and is not ir any case lower than seventy-five
to one hundred; and

(B)

the Canadian value added of which is equsi to or
greater than the Canadian value --*dded of all vehicles
or that "lass produced in Canada by the manufacturer
in the base year;

"Net saLes value" has the meaning assigned by regulations made
under section 273 of the Canadian Customs Act; and

(7) "Tpocified commercial vehicle" m^ans a motor tru<-k, motor
truck chassis, ambulance or chassis thei-for hearse or chassis
therefo^, but does not include:
(a) n^y following vehicle or a chassis designed primarily
therefor, namely a bus, electric trackless troLley bus,
amphibious vehicle, t rac k e d or half-tracked vehicle,
goLf or invalid cart, straddle carrier, motor vehicle
designed primariLy for off-highway use or motor vehicle
specially constructed and equipped to perform special
services or functions, such as, but not limited to, a
fire engine, mobile crane, wrecker, concrete mixer or
mobile cliric, or
(b) r.n-j machine or other article required under Canadian
tariff item 438a to be valued separately under the
tariff item regularly applicable thereto.
3. The Government of Canada may designate a manufacturer not falling
within the categories set out above as being entitled to the benefit
of duty-free treatment in respect of the goods described in this
annex.
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Annex B
(J) Motor vehicles for the transport of persons or articles
as provided for in items 69<->.05 and 692.10 of the Tariff Schedules
of the United states and chassis therefor, but not including electric
trolley buses, three-wheeled vehicles, or trailers accompanying
truck tractors, or charsis therefor.
(?) Fabricated components, not including trailers, tires, or
tubes for tires, for use as original equipment in the manufacture
of motor vehicles of the kinds described in paragraph (1) above,
(3) Articles of the kinds described in paragraphs (1) and (?)
above include such articles whether finished or unfinished but do
not include any article produced with the use of materials imported
into Canada which are product.*: of any foreign country (pxcept
materials produced within the customs territory of the United
States), if the aggregate value of su<~h imported materials when
landed at the Canadian port of entry, exclusive of any landing
cost and Canadian duty, was —
(a) with regard to articles of the kinds described in
paragraph (1), not including chassis, more than 60 percent
until January 1, 1968, and thereafter more than 50 percent
of the appraised customs value of the article imported into
the customs territory of the United States; and
(b) with regard to chassis of the kinds described in
paragraph (l), and articles of the kinds described in paragraph (?), more than 50 percent of the appraised customs value
of the article imported into the customs territory of the
United States.
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